ETC

A REVIEW OF GENERAL SEMANTICS

SUMMER 1957
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In Volume XIV, Number 4:

How Zen Buddhism meets the West through Transactional Psychology is described by STEWART W. HOLMES.

RICHARD K. WELSH argues that there is no substitute for the literary experience.

Jesus had power, writes WALTER STUERMANN, and his name was magic.

STANLEY DIAMOND tells how dairymen came to cooperate as well as communicate.

That dreams are disguises is questioned by C. SCOTT MOSS.

CLEVELAND A. THOMAS describes the use of semantics in high school English.

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ETC.: A REVIEW OF GENERAL SEMANTICS

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ZEN BUDDHISM AND TRANSACTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

STEWART W. HOLMES *

ALMOST fifteen hundred years before John Dewey began talking about transactions, Bodhidharma, following Gautama, the Buddha, formulated in South China a similar notion as a way of life. The power of this formulation grew. By the time of the T'ang and Sung Dynasties of the eighth to twelfth centuries this Eastern orientation was the strongest force in Chinese culture. From China, where it was known as the "Ch'an" school of Buddhism, it spread to Japan. There for the last seven hundred years it has been the dominant spirit in the shaping of Japanese philosophy, art, drama, literature, and "sports." In Japan it is called "Zen."

What attitudes of Zen Buddhism may justly be called transactional? Let us look at these three: (1) the Zen attitude towards symbols; (2) the Zen attitude toward the individual-environment complex; (3) the Zen attitude toward the inside-the-skin complex.

The Zen feeling about symbols, especially verbal symbols, may be summed up in Korzybski's key sentence: "Whatever you say a thing is, it is not." In other words, whatever description or judgment or category you label something with is *your* description, *your* judgment, *your* category; it has nothing intrinsically to do with the thing. Nor is it identical with your feeling for the thing. The transaction which you effect with your environment lives and breathes as a working, vital complex. Words do not live and breathe.

To illustrate this point, let us look at Zen writings. Zen literature contains many *mondo,* brief exchanges between masters and pupils. Most of these seem incomprehensible nonsense to the reader who believes that the fish of life can be caught in a net of words. These *mondo* are designed to help you be "disillusioned" of the illusion that you can say all about anything, that a group of words is identical with some meaning, and that your meaning can be transferred from your head into another's by speaking or writing.

* Dr. Holmes, a contributor since our first volume ("The Tyranny of Premises," *ETC.,* I, 174-178, Spring 1944), is the author of several articles on Robert Browning and formerly was professor of English at The Citadel in South Carolina. He is now with the editorial department of D. C. Heath and Company, Boston.

SHINRO came to Sekito between 700 and 790 A.D. and asked: "What is the idea of Bodhidharma's coming over to China from the West?" In this context this means "What is the truth of Buddhism?" Said Sekito, "Ask the post standing there." And Shinro confessed, "I fail to understand." To that Sekito replied, "My ignorance exceeds yours." This remark opened Shinro's eyes to the notion that Sekito's nonverbal understanding of Buddhism far surpassed anything that could be expressed in words. And it opened his eyes also to the realization that his depending on his verbalistic knowledge of Buddhism was keeping him from *prajna,* the nonverbal knowledge involved in living on the level of "original, unfractured experiences." Here is another *mondo:*

> "What is the essential point of Buddhism?"
> "Unless you have it, you do not understand."
> "Is there any further turning when one thus goes on?"
> "A white cloud is free to float about anywhere it lists—infinitely vast is the sky." [2]

In this *mondo* the master's first reply—"Unless you have it, you do not understand"—expresses to me in eight words what I understand as the primary point in the transactionalist's attitude toward meanings. Meanings exist in people; the meanings of things and of words exist in the reacting individual who brings his pertinent experiences and purposes to the transaction with such stimuli. By filtering and transforming and projecting he fashions a unique world for himself. He can know only what *he* can know; words mean to him only what those words mean to *him.* "Unless you have it, you do not understand." Unless you share my experiences and purposes, you do not understand my meaning.

The Zen masters put experience in living first. This means eating and drinking, working and sleeping, enjoying the look of sunsets and the sound of birds singing—all with the transactional feel. Talking *about* these experiences is discouraged.

An illustration of this is found in one of the most famous *mondo.* A Confucian scholar visited a Zen master. He asked, "What is the ultimate secret of Zen?" The master answered, "You have a fine saying in your Analects: 'I have nothing to hide from you.' So has Zen nothing hidden from you." The scholar answered, "I cannot understand." Later, they went for a walk together along a mountain path. They happened to pass a bush of wild laurel in bloom. The Zen master said, "Do you smell the fragrance of the flowering tree?" The scholar said, "Yes, I do." The master said, "Then, I have hidden nothing from you." Dr. Suzuki, whose works I call upon for most of my information about Zen, writes apropos of such a situation:

[2] D. T. Suzuki, *Studies in Zen* (London: Rider & Co., 1955), pp. 58-59. All further references to this book will be designated within the text by page number.

> However eloquent a medium may be, it will not have the desired effect on anyone who never had an experience somewhat similar in kind though fainter in intensity. . . . On the other hand, if two people have had an experience of the same nature, the lifting of a finger will set the whole spiritual mechanism in vibration, and each can read the other's inner thought. (pp. 65-66)

THESE few quotations may give the reader some confidence in accepting the notion that, to a considerable degree, Zen masters and transactional psychologists share a common attitude toward symbols. We may sum it up thus: we perceive meaning through the medium of symbols as we perceive meaning in nonverbal events, by means of a transaction between a unique individual and his environment. The meaning is not in the words; rather, it results from an abstracting and transforming process, unique for each individual.

This leads us to a consideration of the second point: the Zen attitude toward the individual-environment complex. We have seen that Zen masters consider words to have a relatively minor part in the transmission of the kind of semantic reactions which the masters are characteristically concerned with. Words become simply one part of a communication complex in which similarities of experience and purpose are necessary components in the transaction between two people. Actions speak louder than words. The master's superior understanding of life is expressed when he tells his monk that his ignorance exceeds the monk's. And when the monk asks how he can go forward in his quest for understanding under such a condition, the master replies with a beautiful word picture: "A white cloud is free to float about anywhere it lists—infinitely vast is the sky."

This empathic attitude toward nature lies at the heart of Zen. The *mondo* are filled with references to nature. Zen poetry and painting have nature as their prime subject. When the master called to his monk's mind the feel of a cloud floating through the vast reaches of the sky, he was trying to get him to take a certain attitude toward the quest for understanding "the essential point of Buddhism." The monk probably felt himself to be a discrete individual, A, meeting another discrete individual, B, who had some knowledge in his head. If A could get B to say the right words, then A would know B's truth about life.

The master rejects the monk's interactional premises, which depend upon words, meanings, and names being moved insensately like pieces on a chess board. He does this, not by giving the monk a lecture on transactionalism, but by giving him a mind-picture which may give him the feel of being a part of a great complex, like a cloud in the sky. The cloud did not make itself, it cannot talk, it has no esoteric meaning. It cannot exist apart from the vaporous exhalations of moist earth and lakes, warm updrafts from the earth and cool downdrafts from the upper reaches of the sky. It is functionally part of them. And there above you it floats, a lovely part of the infinite whole. It toils not, neither does it strive to do what it is not "created" to do.

Can the monk feel himself to be a process like this? Can he let himself be carried on the currents of life as the cloud is on the currents of air? Or is he going to continue to struggle to come to terms with life within the Procrustean limits of verbal categories?

WE MUST NOT imagine that nature exists for a Zen master as a source of pretty similes. Nor as an alien something he enjoys coming in contact with. This nature-man dichotomy he rejects as he does all other dichotomies. He thinks of himself as he thinks of a cloud, or a mountain, a dog, or an old rice bag—as part of a unitary process. He does not try to verbalize his feeling of ecological and perceptual enmeshedness with everything else. As the cloud responds in its way to its environment, so the Zen master responds to the conditions of his life. As Dr. Suzuki says:

> This acceptance or transcendence is a human prerogative. We accept Nature's "irrationality" or its "must" deliberately, quietly, and wholeheartedly. It is not a deed of blind and slavish submission to the inevitable. . . . In this there is no force implied, no resignation, but rather participation, assimilation, and perhaps in some cases even identification. . . . Nature produces Man out of itself; Man cannot be outside of Nature, he still has his being rooted in Nature. . . . I am in Nature and Nature is in me. Not mere participation in each other, but a fundamental identity between the two. . . . (pp. 181, 182, 183, 188)

This sounds remarkably similar to the following passage from Donald Piatt's essay in *ETC.'s* recent Special Issue on Transactional Psychology:

> The actual existence, the fact, the event, was the experienced beautiful sunset, incorporating without any bifurcation the organism and the environment together. To say that the beautiful sunset was in my experience is to say, semantically and factually, precisely the same thing as to say that it was an event in nature.[3]

It was no accident that with their Zen training the Sung artists and the classical artists of Japan achieved an unrivalled excellence in conveying through their paintings the feel of nature and of men in nature. Transcending both the photographic and the highly "abstract" approaches to nature, they expressed in their *sumiye* paintings the transactional attitude. Even while you *say* that the organism and the environment are incorporated together without any bifurcation, you are incipiently bifurcating the transaction by the two separate words "organism" and "environment." Because the Zen master feels so profoundly his participation in his environment, he knows words can never communicate this awareness. His world exists for him as he sees it. It exists for him as a result of the transaction between him and the sources of sense stimuli. As a

[3] D. Piatt, "The Import of the Word 'Transaction' in Dewey's Philosophy," *ETC.*, XII, 299-308 (Summer 1955).

teacher he tries to help his pupils achieve similar semantic states so that they may achieve similar transactions. Thus they may "see" life somewhat as he does.

And thus we come to the third point, the Zen attitude toward the inside-the-skin complex. Says Dr. Suzuki:

> There are two kinds of information we can have of reality: one is knowledge *about* it and the other is that which comes out of reality itself. Using "knowledge" in its broadest sense, the first is what I would describe as knowable knowledge and the second as unknowable knowledge.
>
> Knowledge is knowable when it is the relationship between subject and object. Here are the subject as knower and the object as the known . . . [However] the one who has [unknowable knowledge] is absolutely convinced of its universality in spite of its privacy. He knows that everybody has it, but everybody is not conscious of it. (p. 146)

THIS DESCRIPTION of "knowable knowledge" sounds like a statement of what Dewey called *"the* philosophic fallacy, the fallacy of conversion of eventual functions into antecedent existence." Donald Piatt writes, "This fallacy arises in the substitution of conceptualized dual entities, psychological and physical, for the original unfractured experience." [4] "Zen," writes Alan Watts, "is an immediate contact with life, a joining of 'self' and 'life' into so close a unity and rhythm that the distinction between the two is forgotten. . . ." [5] When a monk asked master Chao-chou, "What is the Tao?" he replied, "Usual life is the very Tao." The monk asked again, "How can we accord with it?" Chao-chou answered, "If you try to accord with it, you will get away from it." Or, in Dewey's words, "you will convert eventual functions into antecedent existence."

Korzybski said something similar in "What I Believe."

> I firmly believe that the *consciousness of the difference between these levels of abstractions,* i.e., the silent and the verbal levels, is the key and perhaps the first step for the solution of human problems. . . . There is a tremendous difference between "thinking" in verbal terms, and "contemplating," inwardly silent, on non-verbal levels, and then searching for the proper structure of language to fit the supposedly discovered structure of the silent process that modern science tries to find. If we "think" verbally, we act as biased observers and project onto the silent levels the structure of the language we use, and so remain in our rut of old orientations, making keen, unbiased observations and creative work well-nigh impossible. In contrast, when we "think" without words, or in pictures (which involve structure and therefore relations), we may discover new aspects and relations on silent levels, and so may produce important theoretical results in the general search for a similarity of structure between the two levels, silent and verbal. Practically all important advances are made that way.[6]

[4] Piatt, *op. cit.,* p. 303.

[5] A. W. Watts, *The Spirit of Zen,* (London: John Murray, 1936) p. 131.

[6] Alfred Korzybski, *Manhood of Humanity* (2nd ed., Lakeville, Conn., 1950), pp. xlviii-xlix.

This may cast some light on how Zen functioned in helping to produce the greatest periods in Chinese and Japanese history. Piatt points out:

> Transactional psychologists are now emphasizing, in vehement agreement with Dewey, that experiencings are not passive reception of information from a ready-made environment but are, rather, dynamic ways of structuring, restructuring, and thus utilizing the environment—all in the interest of satisfying the needs of the organism.[7]

I believe Suzuki has in mind a notion similar to the one I get from this quotation when he writes:

> According to the Zen point of view, the universe is a circle without a circumference, and everyone of us is the center of the universe. To put it more concretely: I am the centre, I am the universe, I am the creator. I raise my hand and lo! there is space, there is time, there is causation. (p. 153)

Perhaps this notion is expressed more concretely still by a Zen master in the following *mondo*. A monk asked him, "What is the Tao?" He replied immediately, "Walk on!" In modern terms: don't expect to receive information from a ready-made environment. Act! The inner structuring involved in walking, in behaving in some way, will constitute your answer.

THE ZEN MASTERS effected a revolution in monastic practice in accordance with this orientation. When Buddhist monks came to China from India, they expected people to support them, leaving them time for long meditations and studies in the sacred books. This subject-object situation was changed, most especially by Hui-neng, who died in 713 A.D. In its stead there was established a transactional situation in which the master and disciples worked together in all kinds of *manual* activity. While working they occasionally talked on profound matters, but not in abstract terms. Rather, they used whatever objects were around them as the vehicles of their insights and probings. One of the most famous stanzas in Zen literature is P'ang-yun's:

> How wondrously supernatural,
> And how miraculous this!
> I draw water, and I carry fuel!
> (*trans.* Suzuki)

Another testimony to the transactional and actional character of Zen may be found in noting that the Zen orientation in Japan dominates the practice of flower-arranging, fencing with poles and with swords, archery, wrestling, acting, singing, painting, the tea ceremony, poetry. The transition from a psychology of abstract considerations about "mind," "soul," etc., to a psychology of per-

[7] Piatt, *op. cit.*, p. 303.

sonality, of human motivation—just begun in the Western world—began fourteen hundred years ago in China, in accordance with Zen insight.

I do not mean to say that what went on inside Hui-neng anticipated exactly what went on inside John Dewey. Such a notion violates a basic transactional premise. I *am* trying to say that Zen and transactional psychology furnish us with one meeting point for East and West. Doubtless we Westerners have gone further with experiments in perception, especially under Ames's leadership. Equally doubtless, many Easterners—Zen masters, especially—have probed far more deeply than we have into a special, nonverbal kind of awareness of immediate "unfractured" *experience*. Anyone who wishes testimony to this should read E. Herrigel's *Zen and the Art of Archery*. What we need are Westerners acquainted with transactional psychology who will study under a Zen master until they experience *satori*. They could return and act as a vitalizing factor in the infiltration of our culture by the transactional orientation. If this orientation should affect our culture as Zen affected the great cultures of China and Japan, we could be on the eve of a profound awakening.

Notice to Librarians and Collectors of Bound Volumes:

INDEX TO VOLUME XIV

The Index to the present volume of *ETC.* would ordinarily be published in this, the Summer issue. Since its preparation would have further delayed this issue, it will be sent as an insert with Volume XV, Number 1 (Autumn, 1957), which will appear in December. Those who are having their copies of *ETC.* bound are advised to wait for the Index before sending their copies to the binders.

THE MILK OF HUMAN KINDNESS?

STANLEY DIAMOND *

ON OCTOBER 16, 1956, at Dr. Hayakawa's English 239 Communications Workshop at San Francisco State College, for the second time in three years I heard him say: "Now notice, what I am suggesting is that you view the daily problems in your work, in your social activities, in your homes, as problems of communication. If this way of looking at problems is helpful—if it provides for you one means of dealing with these problems—fine. If not, well, there are always the Great Books." Now what I'm thinking that the Doc meant was, "Let your imagination soar, boy, broaden and deepen it and let that old communication include just about the whole damned works, at least *your* whole damned works."

As I say, this was the second time I'd heard the holy words—holy because I was one of the early converts. I rushed back to my apartment after class to check my 1954 notes to see if I could find the date when first I'd been given the word. It took some searching but, there it was—on a day in July, 1954. "Notice," the notes read, "I am not suggesting that communication is *all* there is. I am suggesting that you try thinking of just about everything in terms of communication." Dr. Hayakawa continued, "Consider communication perhaps in another sense; consider it as a fundamental ethic. And see if any of this is meaningful for you after you've thought about it for a few years."

AT THE TIME I was not operating at this altitude but that one little sentence, *think of just about everything in terms of communication,* was like a lost love come home, and I embraced it with a "Kid—have I been waiting for you a long time." What I mean is that I'd had these vague feelings about understanding and communicating, but they'd never quite made it to the conscious. And that's why the explosion of July, 1954, triggered by the good Doctor, was a booming one which reverberates still in the rat race which is my neuron net. It all made particular sense to me at the time because I was meeting with economists and various trade association representatives throughout California—

* District Supervisor for the Bureau of Milk Control, California State Department of Agriculture. Mr. Diamond, a graduate of the University of California, says he has also been a professional musician, an undernourished writer, and an even more undernourished actor. His article, "Man, Don't Wallow Around in Words," appeared in the Winter 1956-57 issue.

trying to make a series of pricing and fair trade programs workable for the milk industry. In certain areas, the industry at that time was directly violating a large number of these regulatory programs that it was my job to administer.

Talk about communication foul-up at these economists' meetings! Talk about monotonous yak at highly abstract levels—except when the abstraction level dropped a couple of notches unintentionally, which only helped stir up the meaninglessness. In the economics business, where confusion is easy to come by, some of these boys were so glib, so articulate in defending the confusion, that the whole mess seemed momentarily clear only in the anesthetizing mist of the fourth in line of ten scotches on the rocks. And do you think I was any help? Hell, I remember saying things like "Why don't we think about stabilizing conditions with some new ideas?" What the "new ideas" would be and what I meant by "stabilizing" perhaps an astrologer might know. I didn't. If anyone had made me climb down the abstraction ladder to lower levels from that altitude, the pratfall would have matched a sonic boom. There was nothing, you see, to break the fall.

At every meeting I thought, "Man, a multiordinaliteur would have a ball here." "Stability," "economic laws," "private enterprise," "American way," "freedom," were hurled around and bounced off the walls. By using these words, you see, the boys could clear their consciences and a lot of other things, for the record, for all the citizens to see. It's a solid survival technique.

Well, the findings of the economists and trade association representatives finally reached the level of the "Committee." The Committee was one of those mysterious bureaucratic huddles in Sacramento whose members I didn't ever clearly identify. They would meet in one of the echoless corner offices—you know—the kind lined with acoustic tile, a rug (which is the badge of a bureau chief), and several leather chairs—all enshrouded in the bluish smoke of expensive cigars.

The Committee didn't have any extraordinary difficulty in reaching a decision. The general semanticists would have been proud of the decision though. "Let's have a pilot experiment," they said. "We'll let Diamond work out a program for one of our really troublesome areas. How about C-W & H in Northern California? They've been among the worst in California for a couple of years."

SO THAT'S how it started—late in '54. I'd been living between SF and LA so I moved up here to SF more or less permanently. Let me give you some background so we can all wallow in this mess for a while and try to relate the action to general semantics, communication, etc. As some of you may know, milk production and dairy product sales are rigidly regulated in California. Set by the state, for example, are the minimum prices paid to producers at the ranches; minimum prices paid by the stores and restaurants for their purchases from the milk distributors; the minimums when you buy milk at the store, and

when you have it delivered to your home. Some of you didn't know that, did you? Well, it's true. Now, one of the questions involved in the administration of these price control programs is to what degree are these prices being observed. And the degree of compliance varies. When the Committee said the C-W & H area was pretty beat up, what they meant, as I found out later, was that practically all distributors, and there were fourteen of them, were ignoring the legal prices established for home deliveries. For example, if the price was twenty-two cents a quart plus a four-cent service charge for delivery, most milk companies would not collect the service charge if the customer took more than four quarts of milk per delivery. So my job was to get the prices raised to comply with the minimum prices. Imagine my popularity with the distributors and especially the consumers, and especially specially with the mother with the four kids whose husband's take-home pay was $68.75 each week!

I've mentioned the service charge of four cents per delivery. Without going into the economic justification for the charge, it was considered a nuisance by some customers and by some milk distributors. Milk distributors who wanted an illegal competitive advantage could easily find some ways of not collecting the delivery charge. We'll discuss those means later. The point I wish to make is that violations were reported to be widespread in this area. If we could not obtain compliance with the pricing program, we wanted to remove this area from controls. To try to get compliance in this situation could be quite an experiment, couldn't it—a real communication laboratory?

I ASKED that an auditor, Fred, and an investigator, Leo, be made available to me for the experiment. I'd known these men and something of their work throughout the State for the past year. It occurred to me later that a credit was due Dr. J. Samuel Bois, another famed general semanticist, for helping me to choose Fred and Leo. Dr. Bois would certainly say, "You have to think about individuals as well as functions, so try to make the functions fit the people." My point is that Fred enjoyed sitting at a desk all day, making accounts balance and pursuing decimal points with fierce tenacity. Leo could only do this kind of a job if one section of his briefcase was kept adequately supplied with Miltowns. Leo, on the other hand, loved yakking with people and especially, it seemed, if they were strangers. Fred and Leo were extraordinarily well-suited for their jobs.

Making the decision for the first step was easy. Extensionalize, boy. We would ring doorbells, talk to housewives, and later we would audit distributors' records and then talk to distributors. What we were saying, of course, was "Let's get some accurate information"—right? We split up, each assigned to a group of distributors to copy lists of names and addresses of customers. We decided to copy the names and addresses of the larger customers because they would be the most likely to be getting price concessions.

At our first meeting in San Francisco we reviewed the reports on the C-W

& H area. They were fascinating in a stormy sort of way. They said competition was savage in this area. Most distributors accused their competitors of being lying, thieving, double-crossing s.o.b.'s. Bottles and cases were broken and stolen, bottle caps were punctured, and truck tires occasionally were slashed.

The reviewing of the reports took three days. Then came the big doorbell ringing campaign. Leo and I would both call on a sample of 150 customers, and Fred would start to audit the records of the distributors to determine whether or not they were properly accounting for their daily put-up, i.e., the total products bottled or packaged each day. We agreed to meet each evening to exchange information, discuss technique, etc.

Now, I don't know how many of you have ever rung doorbells and yakked it up with the housewives—but it's an experience, it's an experience! I don't ever need any additional proof about "never stepping in the same stream twice." You never knew when a door opened whether it would slam back on you with your mouth still open, or whether a kid would open the door and take a healthy belt at you. Maybe a bosomy *hausfrau* in pin curlers and without makeup would say, "Come in and have a glass of the red, cousin." A husband might answer the door, listen to you for 15 seconds and bellow, "Christ, what'll they want next!" Or if you were invited into the house—kids would tug at your papers, or maybe you'd hold a couple of them while the mother talked on the phone. Sometimes you rang just in time to help move the piano, take a kid to school, call a doctor for someone ill, or any of a dozen other unpredictables. Now and then I had an opportunity to practice my nondirective techniques and there are some gals in the C-W & H area who will never forget that odd little character who rang the bell, said he was getting some information about milk and asked a lot of questions. Some of these gals still ask themselves, "What in the hell made me talk so much that day about things I've never told anyone about?"

We learned a lot punching those doorbells. We learned that about only one out of five of the housewives knew what she paid for her milk; that the driver was frequently the key to the distributor's popularity; that time of service was important; that things like credit given when the husband was on strike were important; that some people preferred buying from a small company; that some people liked to change distributors because they were just bored. Some had cousins who sold insurance to the distributor and were doing him a favor. And some drivers gave the kids ice cream.

After all our information gathered from the doorbell ringing had been broken down and analyzed, we did find that price violations were indeed widespread and that these were handled in many interesting ways. Free products were given to make up the service charge; sometimes drivers returned the sixty cents in cash to the customers and were repaid by their companies. Sometimes the cus-

tomer was billed but the sixty cents was not collected; sometimes one bill, deducting the sixty cents, was given the customer, but the correct bill would be turned in to the office with the driver making up the difference by showing "breakage," which had not, in fact, occurred. Well, there were lots of little cover-up gimmicks used in the conspiracy. It was especially interesting because so many people were involved. Drivers, foremen, managers, owners—all knowingly part of this conspiracy.

OTHER interesting things evolved from our survey. Distributors had never made any surveys as such. The distributors' information came to them from their salesmen and drivers. The distortion of information was sometimes due to the tensions and anxieties of holding a job. For example, if a salesman had a bad day, i.e., had not written any new accounts, he would tell his boss, "You've got to give me a chance to compete, boss. Everybody out there has me beat on price. Nobody is collecting the service charge." And if a driver lost a customer and he was questioned about it, he might well say, "It's that cheap Jew outfit down the street, boss, they've got us beat a cent a quart. I'll get the customer back if I can meet that price." Now, one very important factor was involved at this point. The supervisor, manager, or owner would rarely, if ever, go out and check the salesmen's and drivers' reports. This is how most of the difficulties started, I believe. They started on unverified reports. Supervisors didn't observe a most elementary general semantics principle—extensionality—"go out and check it, man." The drivers' and salesmen's reports were exaggerations, distortions, and frequently just goddam lies.

Our team, with this basic information, now went separate ways. Leo, the investigator, continued talking to the housewives, only this time he obtained statements from some of them and made a tentative evaluation as to whether they might be satisfactory witnesses if we wished to proceed legally against the distributors. The auditor, Fred, continued his audits of the distributors' records. My job was to interview each owner or branch manager, to talk with them about their illegal activities and get their feelings about correcting them.

The three of us continued to meet each night and exchange experiences and views. At the end of the third week we were ready to make a number of generalizations and determine our next major step. Leo had enough statements from the housewives to assure our being confident of winning any civil suits we might initiate. Fines in excess of $50,000 could have been sought through the courts against the distributors. Leo's statements could also have been used to suspend or revoke the licenses of these distributors if we chose this type of action.

Fred's audits disclosed that accounting practices were loose; that products especially could not be traced accurately. Where drivers received monies to cover illegal rebates they had given, these charges were posted to a miscellaneous expense account and called "incentive plan."

In my discussions with the owners and managers some said in off-the-record conversations that the situation was hopeless, that controls in that area should be removed and the boys should be permitted to "slug it out." A few distributors had very few illegal sales and did not wish to get into the bloody arena. Several branch managers of major distributors said they would make no admissions; that they were going to hold and increase their business, and those who got in their way, including our team, had better be prepared for the consequences. "Look," one manager said, "You're talking about my job. I've been with the company seventeen years. If I don't hold my own in this rat race I'm through—I'm 42 years old, I have a wife and two kids, a plaster on the house and $750 in the bank. You think I'm going to be caught draggin' at the end of this battle, with district and division managers beating on my back with raised quotas! Hell, man, if my volume falls off the guys in San Francisco just smile and say, 'We're sure sorry Mike, but you know how it is—why don't you try the beer business?' You characters, you bureaucrats think you can sit around with your feet on a desk, look out at the bay and run a milk business. Christ, you should have to meet a payroll, a sales quota, etc., etc."

And Mike wasn't the only one. And I'm not condemning Mike. The poor guy lived under this crushing pressure every waking hour and most of his dreams were probably a purplish pool of his competitors, district and general sales managers at the head office, all of them in a boiling, bubbling stew. Mike would be turning the fire up a little higher and drooling.

Raymond interested me too. He was the thirty-two-year-old cardiac with a Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration diploma for '48 on the wall. He was a local branch manager of one of the main companies. He worked in his shirt sleeves. "Sure," he said, noticing my examination of his diploma, "Sure, I'm a Cambridge boy but this one wears brass knuckles. Nobody in this valley has better statistics than I have, but these numbers on paper, these graphs don't mean a goddam thing. What counts is what's going on out there—the battle in new tracts, on the street, at the doors of the customers. "Do you know," he went on, "this is a war. I have guys watching my competitors' trucks, following their salesmen. I try to hire their men—they try to get mine. They break my bottles—I break theirs. My drivers tangle, and it gets bloody. Sometimes the tires on my trucks are slashed, and sometimes my competitors' tires get slashed. You know, if I ever run into that real special bastard, Mike, I'll kill the s.o.b."

"Have you ever seen this special guy, Mike," I asked.

"Sure, I've seen him," Ray yelled. "It's my business to know my competition."

"Ever talk to him?"

"Yeah, about a year ago we met in a bar. He said hello. He offered to buy me a drink. I told him to stuff it."

"Never talked to him since?"

"No, why?"

"He says he thinks you're probably a nice enough guy, underneath. He knows you're a Cambridge boy. He's older than you. He's from Pennsylvania—Business Administration Graduate School, 1941. Believe he was a Phi Delt."

"I was a Zeke. Only knew one Phi Delt worth the powder to blow him to hell."

"Well, think about it and I'll be back in a few days."

"By the way, what was your house?"

"I was an Alpha Delt."

"Hmm, my brother-in-law is an Alpha Delt."

"Maybe you'll let me meet him sometime. I'll see you next week, Ray, and think about how we can improve things around here, especially with Mike."

"Now, look, don't start me on that kick again. Knock it off!"

One real inspiration came to me through Art, an owner and operator of one of the smaller plants. Art said, "I don't have much trouble. I know a lot of people in the valley, lived here all my life. Nobody gets my old customers, and I get a little bit of the new move-ins."

"Do you think we can do much about this situation here in the valley?" I said.

"You know what I'd do, if I were you?"

"No, tell me, Art."

"I'd find out if the San Francisco and Oakland headquarters of these outfits would allow the local managers to meet and discuss local conditions by themselves. If they'd do this, I'd set a deadline for having all deals cut off. After that date, I'd make these local managers call each other on any illegal deals their drivers or salesmen report. I think these guys would work together if they'd only talk to each other."

"Thanks, Art," I said, "I think you've given me an idea."

Now, was anything ever more obvious? Art's comments crystalized this situation for me. This was really a simple problem of communication. I was just positive that Hayakawa, Lee, Johnson, et al., were at my ear, nodding knowingly and saying, "This is what we try to keep telling you, cousin, it's a simple matter of communication."

Now in the third week, I talked to head office sales and administration executives of major distributors in Oakland and San Francisco, presented them with this plan. Effective September 1, let's eliminate all sampling. Effective September 1, let's cut off all illegal deals. Effective September 1, on any reports of illegal sales, the local manager receiving the report will phone the local manager of the company complained against. The manager of the company complained against will investigate the complaint and report back to the manager

making the complaint. If this tentative plan was agreed upon, I would call a meeting of all distributors in the area. I would outline the plan and answer any questions. I held a nasty club all this time, of course. The club was the rarely mentioned threat of civil penalties and license suspension or license revocation. That club played its sinister role well.

In any event, the head office executives agreed to let us try our plan and a meeting was called. Thirty-two owners and managers with various assistants appeared at the meeting. Like any solid old Rotary, Kiwanis, or Exchange club, we opened the meeting by everyone giving his name, company, and position. Then I read extracts from about fifteen violations which Leo had picked up. The customers and milk distributors' names were not disclosed. The feedback cues indicated to me that every distributor present felt all fifteen violations were his. He was seeing, I felt, the embarrassment and humiliation of a first page spread in the local press, plus $7500 in penalties, plus an expensive defense if he wished to resist.

Then I read our plan, with the September 1 target date. And then came the questions. Question: "How the hell do I know what my drivers do out there?" Answer: "First, see that your drivers pay for everything they take out. Second, why do you pay route supervisors? Make *them* supervise. Third, who's running your business, you or your drivers? How about you controlling your show? Fourth, simplest of all, just go out and check your drivers' stories—take the driver along."

Question: "Suppose somebody doesn't want to go along with this program?" Answer: "Every day of every violation is a $500 fine. We would prefer not to take any action against anyone. We are asking you to give this a try."

Question: "How much service can we expect from the State?" Answer: "For three months we'll give you twenty-four-hour service—i.e. you call our office about any complaint or problem. Someone will see you the next day."

Then each man in the room was called upon by name, first name, of course, for any comment he might wish to offer. And there were a lot of those. Mike and Ray shook hands—still chilly though. But it was a start. September 1 was two weeks away.

I TELL YOU, it was the damndest thing you ever saw, those two weeks before September 1. Ray knocked off thirty-five cases of milk, all illegal. Bill, another manager, who we thought was rather clean, knocked off nineteen cases of illegal sales. Mike, who we thought was one of the worst, only had ten cases to knock off. It was a soul-searing torture for these sales-minded managers to tell customers, "Sorry, either you pay the new prices or I can't serve you." And I had some thoughts about homesteading a few acres on the moon if the plan goofed.

September 1 arrived. Leo, Fred and I were on hand. We split up, each to

contact five distributors during the day and to find out whether the program was starting out as agreed upon by the distributors and by us. Distributors were tense and wary. Everything seemed OK for the first day. The next two days we each took part of the area to stop drivers and talk with them about the situation. Everything was quiet. Still OK. Everyone was on the ball. No violations were reported. There were no fights, no tire-slashings, no broken bottles. Pretty good, but still, only the third day.

We moved back to SF on the fourth day. I asked Leo to spend one day each week for the next month back in the area talking with the distributors, stopping a few drivers; just let them know we're around. The second month Leo was to spend two days in the area, again just checking, just being around and available. He reported that the local managers were all calling one another on activities in the field, that credit managers had scheduled a meeting for a discussion of their mutual problems, and conditions generally were looking up.

At the end of three months we called another meeting of all distributors to see if our luck was holding out. Everyone was cautiously confident that conditions would remain stable. The comments went like this: "I have no complaints. I've called five of my competitors. I believe they've told me the truth each time. I have never lied to any competitor who's called me. I like this." Another: "My volume is down 100 gallons a day but I run my show now—my drivers and salesmen don't run it. I can sleep nights now. I used to have nightmares about my men getting slugged, my trucks wrecked, and my milk poisoning kids. What's more important, in a couple of months, when I get my routes reshuffled, I'll have a black figure at the end of the month—and I haven't had one of those in a long time." Another: "You know what I think? A man just has a hell of a job sitting across from a guy at a table or talking to him on a phone and telling him a lie. I think that's what's making this thing work." Another: "You know what I do sometimes? When one of my drivers says 'Those bastards down the highway are wheeling and dealing in the new tract outside of town,' I ask, 'Who told you, Bob?' He says, 'Two of my customers told me.' I say, "Hop in the car, Bob, let's go talk to your customers.' Why hell, nobody ever told Bob nothin'. And that's stopped a lot of squawking around my place." Another: "We're getting along fine but the State has to have somebody around here. I can tell you my competitor is a thieving chiseler, but I can't tell him that. Of course, he can say the same thing about me. My point is, we've gotta have a third party without an axe to grind." Another: "As long as I can talk to the local manager here and don't have to call his SF office to report anything, I'll get along fine." And so it went. Everybody had something to say—all of it encouraging.

I WENT BACK to Los Angeles to complete some work and returned to the Bay Area in July, 1955. We worked out a similar program in another area in Northern California. It was a breeze. Extensionalize, push like hell to prevent

confusion of abstractive levels; listen, listen, listen; remember the *et cetera.* There's always more. Reduce the threat to communication, reduce the threat, reduce the threat.

REVIEWING these two experiences, let me think through again the very conscious application of some aspects of communication study to the problem. There are plenty of credits for everyone but star billing for this low budget who-done-it should be given to the general semantics boys. If I find out later that I'm wrong, I'll make 'em bloody villains in my next article for *ETC.*

First we went out to get "information." "How extensional can you get?" Leo asked after I'd explained extensionality to him. "Any more extensional and I'd have moved in with some of the dames I talked to."

When Leo said he talked to these dames, he meant he listened, and so did I. We listened and we listened. Not empathically, of course, all the time, but carefully just about all the time and, by and large, understandingly. "Watch your projections, boy," we cautioned.

Our focus, our orientation, I think, was most important. By that I mean we were not out for some quick, smashing victory in battle. We were prepared to be patient, to listen and to evaluate what we heard in a speaker's context, if possible. For example, it just didn't mean too much to me at the time to have the distributor Mike bellow, "You bastards are wrecking our American system. This country was built on freedom—and that's what you guys will never understand. You'll never understand that." As Leo put it, "We just sit around and let 'em run down." In this case, all I saw was poor Mike getting a little relief from the tensions and frustrations of daily, inconclusive battle. After Mike had quieted down, I did ask in my silkiest Rogerian, "You feel then, Mike, that the State's interfering with your freedom to operate?" And Mike took off again on another three-minute tirade. So I said, "The hell with it, I'll slip Mike the Rogerian some other time."

My point here is that we wouldn't dream of arguing with Mike; he was just inaccessible at this point. What was important with Mike was that we could always enter his plant and we could always talk with him. Don't argue, debate or talk for a victory, is the way we thought about it. If we lost contact with anyone, if they refused to see us, this we would have considered catastrophic. I put it to you, as long as that communication is open, you'll work it out. You'll work out just about anything.

FOR our industry meetings we arranged things like having a trade association secretary give a lunch for all the local managers and owners. Later, at our meeting, we sat around a table—no authoritarian line-up for us. Every man's name, his company, and his position were written on a blackboard. Every man introduced himself.

We watched details at the meeting. Fred, with his coat off, tugged occasionally at his frayed but sturdy, faded blue suspenders. Leo had stuffed his tie in his pocket and hung his coat over his chair.

My opening at our first meeting was something like, "I think, men, we are all on the same side. I think we all have the same goals. We want you to operate in the black; we want to prevent wide price fluctuations; we want to prevent price wars; we want the present number and kinds of distributors to remain in competition; we want increased efficiencies, with savings passed on to the consumers. What I'm saying, I suppose, is, let's have the same competition but let's play according to the rules." This was intended as a kind of shared perception at an industry rather than an individual plant level.

We'd get back to the lowest abstractive level from time to time by reminding the distributors of our customer survey. I'd read from a report, "Here's Mrs. W. H. on Happy Valley Lane, who says, 'A salesman named H called on me about July 19, three months ago. He said he represented X Company. He said he'd give me a rebate in cash of $1 each month if I'd change to his company. I did change and he's been giving me the $1 rebate each month.' " This was intended to reestablish our position as knowing what the hell we were talking about.

Each man present was called on by first name for his comments on any questions. This was our feedback. And anyone who said, "Nothing to say, now," or "Let me think about it," we noted and saw later, privately. It's interesting that when you think of a feedback and its purpose you tend to listen differently, to hear differently.

Another aspect of communication which I'd been interested in utilizing and now had the opportunity to use was the "grapevine." For example, we were quite sure that one driver who had been stopped and spoken to became five drivers by the time the information was reported back to his supervisors. So Leo would stop and interview drivers of three companies in one part of the county, race to another part of the county fifteen miles away and stop several more. Then he would speed away another fifteen miles and do the same thing. What distributors told us was "The county is crawling with you State guys and full of guys visiting customers." We suggested that the housewives discuss our visits with their drivers. And that reached the distributors as "guys going up and down the streets ringing every doorbell in the county."

REMEMBER our discussions of the "self-fulfilling prophecy"? One thing that flipped us and to which we gave the highest priority for action was when a manager or supervisor said, "Look, this is all pretty talk and you guys are trying, but I'll give this deal three months, and it'll fall apart." This guy had to have the program "fall apart" in three months. His self-concept, in a sense, was under attack. These characters were often tough to handle. One method that

worked in one case was to phone this distributor each week for several weeks to check on local conditions, and Leo would see him on his visits in the area. Because we gave him a kind of responsibility for reporting conditions, he took on a sense of responsibility for maintaining our program.

I also recall one supervisor, Ashworth, who said, "I've been working in this valley for fifteen years and I'm telling you, in four months these guys will be back with their axes. You guys don't understand. It'll never, never, never work. Right now, I could get you twenty violations in twenty minutes." After an hour of discussing this situation with this Ashworth, I felt he could not be reached; there probably wasn't much I could do with him. You know what I did do later though? I told his boss, "For Christ's sake, Art, do me a favor and tell that guy Ashworth to just shut up. He'll kill our program before it starts." When I next saw Art, I asked what he'd done about Ashworth. "Ashworth? I did like you said, I told him, 'Goddam it, Ashworth, if you want to work here, just shut up—if the State's program doesn't work, you'll be the first one to go.' " Rough? Sometimes this is what it takes—if it works. As far as I know, it worked with Ashworth.

I think of our either/or discussions, too. We didn't ever expect immediate and enduring stability. We expected difficulties to develop on prices from time to time. We expected some distributors to assist us aggressively in achieving stability and we expected others to drag along. We expected to and did give more attention to the "draggers." My point is that we would not abandon the program with an "either you guys are all with us or out this deal goes." We thought in terms of degrees of cooperation and compliance.

Now don't you think because we came out of this conquerors and kings, ear-weary and hoarse, but haloed, that we therefore packed up our Korzybski, Hayakawa, Johnson, Rapoport and Lee, stuffed their worn and fingered pages into the saddlebags and rode off along the dusty trail, steely eyes searching the hills for smoke signals and the trails for moccasin prints—seeking out more of the dreaded Sioux. We hadn't that much reason for self-congratulation.

We did what we managed to do because the distributors were ready for it, and we knew it. They were losing money; they were sick and tired of the violence, the daily tension, the daily anger, waiting for competitors' tricks, actual and imagined. So we threw every general semantics theory and communication technique known to us into this steaming, savage, stinking mess.

I put it to you kids. Didn't general semantics come up smelling like a non-verbal rose?

THE NAME OF JESUS:
Word-Magic in The Book of Acts

WALTER E. STUERMANN *

"AND God said, 'Come let us go down, and there confuse their language.' " At the very beginning of the Bible the misfortunes of confused speech are memorialized in the story of the Tower of Babel. Even God feared the power that comes to man with clear, consistent, and useful speech. Words bring with them energy as well as insights. Words are the vehicles of power, power sufficient to cause the gods to tremble.

The first story of creation relates that order was brought forth from chaos when God *spoke,* "Let there be light!" The prophets, instruments of divine speech, open their mouths to declare, "Thus saith the Lord." By Amos, Jeremiah, and others, the utterance of God's words was equivalent to the injection of divine power into the human situation. "Is not my word like fire, saith the Lord, and like a hammer that breaketh the rock in pieces?" (Jer. 23:29) A psalmist records for us that God uttered his voice and the earth melted. And Joel (3:16) cries out, "And the Lord will roar from Zion, and utter his voice from Jerusalem; and the heavens and the earth shall shake." The writer of Hebrews warns that we listen to "him that warneth from heaven, whose voice shook the earth." (Heb. 12:25-26) From start to finish the Bible is a commemoration of the power of words. It teaches on every hand that words are pregnant with good or evil for those who utter them or hear them.

TODAY many Christian preachers feel compelled to end each of their prayers with the formula, "in the name of Jesus Christ." Some will even argue that no prayer is really authentic or efficacious, if it is not presented in this name. We note further that a sermon is often introduced by the eisorcistic expression, "In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit." The ubiquitous benediction frequently includes an appeal to the name of Jesus or the name of the Lord. Furthermore, we remember that the Lord's Prayer includes the ascription, "Hallowed be thy name." An uneasy feeling steals upon us and comes to expression in the question, "Are these appeals to the name of Jesus or the name of God instances of word-magic?" Perhaps such phrases have in many cases

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become purely ceremonial items for many people. Even so, do the ceremonial phrases reflect a practice of word-magic in the biblical period?

Word-magic implies the identification of names and things, or at least an intimate and indissoluble connection between names and things. It was unquestionably practiced in the biblical period. The sacred name of God (YHWH) was not to be pronounced, lest his power or presence be thus invoked. The specific commandment against invoking the name of God in vain or to evil intent seems to be a prescription against excessive or unwarranted use of a name-formula, lest incautious usage bring with it havoc. Turning-points in the lives of biblical characters were marked by changes of names. Late scrupulous editors of the biblical texts replaced names taken in honor of Canaanite gods (Ishbaal = man of Baal) by terms of deprecation (Ishbosheth = man of shame). Blessings and curses seem, by their very utterance, to bring good or evil fortunes. Isaac's blessing of Jacob rather than Esau, the first-born, could not be repudiated or supplemented by a second blessing (Gen. 27:30-40). Balaam was compelled to bless the invading Israelite troops, rather than curse them as demanded by Balak, the Moabite, and with the pronunciation of the blessing Balak sensed the defeat of his cause. A multitude of other biblical passages testify that God's words bore power and that the utterance of the names of humans or deities brought about an invasion of the natural realm by supernatural forces.

IN THIS NOTE we direct attention primarily to the use of the name of Jesus in the Book of the Acts of the Apostles. The insistent repetition of the formula, "in the name of Jesus," suggests a practice of word-magic.

Before we examine the usages in Acts, let us note that there is an explicit or implicit use of the name of Jesus in the Synoptic Gospels, in the Pauline letters, and in other New Testament texts as well as in the Book of Acts. Mark 9:38-41 records an unusual episode in which a person outside the circle of Jesus' followers used the name with marked success.

> John said to him, "Teacher, we saw a certain man casting out demons in your name; and we restrained him, for he was not following us." But Jesus said, "Do not hamper him; for no one who does a work in my name will be able later to speak evil of me. For he who is not against us is for us."

According to the biblical records, Jesus himself did not use his own name in a formula to effect healings or miracles. He apparently sensed that he was a repository of power and recognized that he had no need of a name-formula. But his followers employed a formula which included the phrase, "in the name of Jesus Christ," or some variant of it (Cf. Luke 10:17). Matthew 7:21-23 brings before us another testimony concerning the name in which Jesus acknowledges that the name-formula was in use.

> Not every one who says to me, "Lord, Lord," shall come into the kingdom of heaven, but he who does the will of my father who is in heaven. Many shall say to me in that day, "Lord, Lord, did we not prophesy in your name, and cast out demons in your name, and perform great works in your name?" And then I will assert to them, "I never knew you. Go from me, you evil-doers!" [1]

In the Book of Acts there are thirty direct or indirect references to the use of the name of Jesus Christ in order to effect startling events. Of these, four are cases in which the text seems to record directly episodes in which the name-formula was employed. Following the sermon which he delivered at Pentecost, Peter appealed to the crowd, "Repent, and every one of you be baptized in the name of Jesus Christ for the forgiveness of your sins; and you shall receive the gift of the Holy Spirit." (Acts 2:38)

Shortly thereafter, when he and John encountered the lame man at the gate of the Temple, Peter addressed the beggar, "I do not have silver and gold, but what I have I give to you; in the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth, walk!" (Acts 3:6) This case is of particular significance, for we have no evidence to justify the hypothesis that there was a state of faith present in the patient. The pronunciation of the name-formula apparently brought health to the lame man. On his first trip to Macedonia, Paul drove an evil spirit from a slave girl at Philippi with the command, "I command you in the name of Jesus Christ to come out of her." (Acts 16:18) Here again no state of faith in the slave girl may be assumed.

The fourth case is the most interesting. When Paul came to Ephesus, he encountered some Jewish exorcists who tried to use the name-formula. Acts 19:13-17 gives the account thus:

> And some itinerant Jewish exorcists tried to pronounce the name of the Lord Jesus over those who had evil spirits, saying, "I adjure you by the Jesus whom Paul preaches." Seven sons of a Jewish high priest named Sceva were doing this. But the evil spirit answered and said to them, "Jesus I know, and Paul I know; but who are you?" And the man in whom the evil spirit was leaped on them, mastered all of them, and overpowered them. . . . And this became known to all residents of Ephesus, both Jews and Greeks; and fear fell upon all of them; and the name of the Lord Jesus was lauded.

The Jewish exorcists assumed that the use of the name-formula was itself efficacious. The story in Acts apparently stresses that the use of the formula was, by this time, an exclusive possession of Christian initiates. This stands in contrast to the account in Mark 9:38-41, which was quoted above.

The text of Acts also provides us with indirect evidence of twenty-five or twenty-six other uses of or references to the use of the name-formula. Peter

[1] Among other passages outside the Book of Acts which tell of the use of the name of Jesus are these: John 3:18; 15:16; 16:23-24; 17:11-12; Romans 10:13; I Corinthians 6:11; Ephesians 1:21; Philippians 2:9-10; Colossians 3:17; James 5:14; I Peter 4:14; I John 3:23, 5:13; Hebrews 1:4; and Revelation 2:3; 2:13; 3:8.

explains his healing of the lame man to the crowd by saying, "And his name, by faith in his name, has made this man strong" (Acts 3:16). Inquiring into the healing episode, the priests and Temple officials ask, "By what power or by what name did you do this?" (Acts 4:7) And Peter responds, "Let it be known to all of you, and to all of the people of Israel, that in the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth . . . this man stands before you well" (Acts 4:10). He also adds, "And salvation is found in no other name under heaven given among men in which we must be saved" (Acts 4:12). In their deliberations over the case, the Temple officials say,

> "But in order that it not spread further among the people, let us warn them to speak no more to any one in this name." And calling them, they charged them not to speak or teach at all in the name of Jesus. (Acts 4:17-18)

Following the crisis, the Christian community in prayer utters this petition,

> And now, O Lord, look upon their threats, and give to your servants the ability to speak your word with much boldness, while you stretch out your hand to heal, and signs and wonders come to pass through the name of your holy servant Jesus. (Acts 4:30)

A second set of episodes of healing in Jerusalem invite another priestly inquiry and warning, which, according to the records in Acts, involve three more references to the name (Acts 5:28; 5:40; 5:41). The reception of Philip's preaching in Samaria is described in Acts 8:12: "When they believed Philip who preached about the kingdom of God and the name of Jesus Christ, they were baptized, both men and women." This is followed by a reference to the name in the record in Acts 8:16 of the mission of Peter and John to check up on Philip's Samaritan preaching. In Acts 9:14, 15, and 16, the conversation between the Lord and Ananias, a disciple of Damascus commissioned to aid Paul, contains three more references to the name.

The citizens of Damascus are cited as responding to Paul's preaching by saying, "Is this not the man who destroyed in Jerusalem those who called on this name?" (Acts 9:21). When Paul came to Jerusalem as a Christian,

> Barnabas took him and brought him to the apostles, and related to them how he had seen the Lord on the road, and that he spoke to him, and how in Damascus he had preached boldly in the name of Jesus. And he was going in and out among them at Jerusalem, preaching boldly in the name of the Lord. (Acts 9:27-29)

Peter's speech to Cornelius and his household contains this testimony,

> And he [God] commanded us to preach to the people, and to witness that this is the one ordained by God to be judge of the living and the dead. To this one all the prophets bear witness that all who believe in him receive forgiveness of sins through his name. (Acts 10:42-43)

He then "commanded them to be baptized in the name of Jesus Christ" (Acts 10:48). The Jerusalem Council records contained in Acts (15:14, 15:26) present two additional references to the name.

At Ephesus Paul discovered certain disciples of an Alexandrian, Apollos. After Paul spoke with them, "they were baptized in the name of the Lord Jesus. And when Paul laid hands upon them, the Holy Spirit came on them, and they spoke with tongues and prophesied" (Acts 19:5). Near the end of Paul's career, the prophet Agabus predicted suffering for the Apostle at Jerusalem. He responded,

> What are you doing, weeping and breaking my heart? For I am prepared, not only to be bound, but also to die in Jerusalem for the name of the Lord Jesus. (Acts 21:13)

In Acts 22:16 Paul, as he defended himself before a threatening crowd, spoke of Ananias' appeal to him at Damascus: "Rise and be baptized, and wash away your sins, calling on his name." Finally, there is the reference by Paul in his defense before King Agrippa to his life before conversion: "I was convinced that I ought to do many things in opposing the name of Jesus of Nazareth" (Acts 26:9).

ACCORDING to the texts of Acts as well as other books of the New Testament, the name-formula was used as a baptismal formula or as a part of a baptismal formula. It is difficult to tell if there is a clear-cut case of word-magic in the instances where the name is used in the act of baptism. Did the pronunciation of the name-formula itself effect a change of status? We doubt that the early church leaders themselves conceived the problem in this way. Nevertheless, in terms of the abundant testimonies in the Old and New Testaments to the mysterious and magical significance of names, it seems likely that the baptismal use of the formula was a case of word-magic. The name-formula was also used in cases of exorcism and healing and we have several clear pieces of evidence that there was practice of word-magic in these situations. Even the striking case of the attempted exorcism by the sons of Sceva, which seems to imply an exclusive possession of the power of the name by Christians, suggests the magical potency of the formula. The name-formula is also associated in various ways with the reception of forgiveness, speaking in tongues, signs and wonders, and the gift of the Holy Spirit, though not in any simple and single manner. The abundant testimonies indicate, however, that some unusual power was brought near at hand by the utterance of the formula.

DREAM SYMBOLS AS DISGUISES†

C. SCOTT MOSS *

ANCIENT MAN intuitively recognized the importance of dreams; imbued with animistic conceptions, he interpreted them as communications from the supernatural. They were considered to possess a greater reality than conventional sensory impressions and were highly valued as an indisputable source of advice and guidance. In spite of thousands of years of intense interest, however, little progress was made toward a scientific understanding until the nineteenth century, when Sigmund Freud emphasized the importance of unconscious processes in the determination of human behavior and developed free association as a technique to investigate them. He credited dreams as being the "royal road to the unconscious." Although he formulated basic principles for dream interpretation, the difficulties encountered when dealing with the unconscious and symbolic aspects of human behavior have continued to limit severely the scientific investigation of this phenomenon.

One aspect of several interrelated and continuing investigations will be reported here. In this research, data provided by the intensive study of a patient in psychotherapy are used to further our understanding of the symbolic language of dreams.

The principal measuring instrument used was a form of the semantic differential, a scaling device developed by Professor C. E. Osgood for the objective measurement of the feeling aspects of meaning. This is not to be confused with the "structural differential" of Korzybski, which is an educational device for discriminating levels of abstraction. In the construction of the differential, advanced statistical methods were used to isolate a limited number of relatively unrelated dimensions of meaning in the English language. Specific scales consisting of polar adjectives were identified as representative of these aspects; for example, Good-Bad, Weak-Strong, and Active-Passive reflect the Evaluative, Potency and Activity dimensions, respectively. These polar terms were used to

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define the ends of seven-point scales. In practice, an individual judges a particular concept against a set of these scales. Several sets of polar terms represent a single dimension and the judgments on these are then averaged. This procedure constitutes an operational definition of the meaning of that concept, for the individual, at that time. In this manner, changes in the meaning of a concept over a period of time, the subtle differences between two or more concepts, and the individual differences in the meaning of a single concept may be quantitatively represented. Two sets of profiles (Figure 1) will serve to illustrate the method.

The patient-subject in this experiment was a 28-year-old white male, married and employed as an inventory stock clerk. His first hospitalization occurred in the South Pacific in 1945, when, as a military non-combatant, he attempted suicide with an overdose of barbiturates. Subsequently a depressive reaction failed to respond to medication and psychotherapy, and he was given a medical discharge. He continued to suffer physical symptoms, such as gastrointestinal upsets, easy fatigability, and headaches at the time of hospitalization. The results of a neurological examination were entirely negative, and he received a diagnosis of "Psychoneurosis." The patient was assigned for treatment and initial tests indicated that he was a good candidate for hypnotherapy.

FREUD maintained that dreams mirror man's innermost unconscious thoughts and feelings, attitudes that frequently differ from those expressed in the waking state. A test of this assumption involved measurement of the conscious and unconscious changes in meaning experienced by the patient during psychotherapy. Conventional studies of such attitude changes have relied upon the patient's conscious statements and judgments. The obvious limitation to this procedure is that a large proportion of an individual's thoughts and feelings may be immediately unverbalizable, being subject to the process of repression. Psychologists are agreed that hypnosis apparently reduces self-critical reactions of shame, embarrassment, and guilt, which act to inhibit the awareness of many attitudes, and for this reason, a hypno-projective technique was used in the attempt to reduce the defensive operations of the patient and thereby obtain a more accurate, measurable expression of underlying attitudes.

The patient was asked to make periodic waking and hypnotic ratings on the differential of the most significant people in his life; for instance, *Mother, Father, Wife, Employer, Therapist,* and *Himself.* Prior to the waking ratings of each concept, the patient relaxed and associated about the concept for 10 minutes. The scales of the differential were then read, and he responded with the values which reflected the meaning of the concept to him. He was next inducted into the hypnotic state. Again he was asked to associate to the concept. These instructions usually evoked a spontaneous and vivid flow of thoughts and feelings which frequently gravitated to highly emotional early memories. After 10 minutes ratings were obtained through employment of a hypno-projective



FIGURE 1: Illustration of application of the semantic differential for measuring the meanings of concepts by a patient in therapy. A: upper profiles, rerating of the same concept after a three-month interval. B: lower profiles, differentiation of two concepts.

procedure designed to maintain his mood-set and to reduce his feeling of responsibility for his judgments. It was suggested that he visualize a black movie screen with the concept at the top. As the various scales were read, these would appear as if projected onto the screen. Immediately following the appearance of a scale, a small black indicator would appear at a point which reflected the generated mood state. It was emphasized that placement of the indicator would occur without volitional guidance. Questioning elicited that the patient perceived a clear visual hallucination and that the marker moved without conscious direction. Waking ratings obtained in this manner were defined as a measure of conscious attitude and hypnotic ratings as a measure of unconscious meaning.

Obtained data indicated a wide discrepancy between waking and hypnotic ratings at the beginning of therapy and a significant reduction as treatment proceeded. Hypnotic ratings frequently had a much more negative connotation, suggesting the presence of marked ambivalence and repressed hostility. Briefly, these results were interpreted to mean that areas of neurotic conflict within the personality are characterized by dissociation such that different levels of meaning, conscious and unconscious, coexist, and that as conflict is resolved, there is integration of these originally discrepant levels. This interpretation is supported by the fact that, evaluated by several criteria such as psychiatric staff opinion and psychological tests, this was a successful treatment case. Although not the subject of this paper, these results suggest that the discrepancy between conscious and unconscious attitudes obtained in this manner may provide a measure of the degree of neurotic involvement, as well as an index for improvement with psychotherapy.

THE PATIENT was a prolific dreamer, and 76 of his dreams were analyzed to obtain data for this experiment. At the beginning of each therapy session he reported dreams occurring in the interim. Recall was facilitated through hypnotic revivification; that is, after the dream was reported, the patient entered a hypnotic trance where the dream sequence was reinstated through suggestion. This procedure often stimulated recall of forgotten details. The most important characters in the dream were then rated in the waking state by the patient. Waking ratings of dream personages were compared to the most recent waking and hypnotic ratings of the individuals represented. The patient rated a total of 66 dream representations of one or the other of the important people in his life, and in 51 instances the ratings of the attitudes depicted in the dream were closer to the hypnotic rating of the individual represented. Instances in which the meanings of dream figures were closer to the waking ratings occurred only during the last stages of therapy when there was relatively little difference between the waking and hypnotic ratings. These results substantiate the psychoanalytic belief that dreams mirror aspects of meaning outside waking awareness. The correspondence of dream with hypnotic ratings indicates that they "tap" a common substratum of unconscious meaning. It would appear that, correctly understood, dreams provide a source of important information concerning unconscious interpersonal attitudes.

Freud accounted for the unintelligibility of dreams with the assumption that while censorship exerted by the conscience is reduced in the sleep state, it is not entirely eliminated, and as a result, while repressed impulses are allowed expression, they are disguised so as not to arouse anxiety. He postulated that dream symbols are used to represent a prohibited desire in a disguised form. In the present experiment, the idea of symbol disguise is translated into the testable concept of semantic distance. In the absence of anxiety, choice of a symbol

should be determined largely on the basis of similarity in meaning, a relatively direct representation being selected. However, anxiety-arousing impulses should force the choice of symbols that are semantically more distant. To the extent that a symbol is semantically distant from the latent content, its representation may be said to be disguised. The differential was used to measure the semantic distance between the dream symbol and the content it represented (Figure 2).



FIGURE 2: Psychoanalytic conception of censorship in symbol selection. Meaning of a concept is represented by a sphere; overlap between spheres represents sharing of properties. Theoretically, the greater the anxiety stimulated by the latent impulse, the greater the need for disguise and the less the semantic relationship.

IDENTIFICATION of the meaning of dream symbols used by the patient became a primary problem at this point, which brings us to the use of still another hypnotic procedure. It has been established by psychologists that hypnosis provides access to the symbol-translating mechanism in some subjects; these individuals are capable of dreaming on command or of translating symbolic productions. In this study reliance upon the conventional and unreliable intuitive approach to dream interpretation was avoided by having the patient interpret his own dreams. The patient free-associated to the dream elements, first in waking and then in the hypnotic state, in order to establish the meaning of the latent content represented by the symbols. The associative material obtained in hypnosis was invariably richer and more centrally related to the meaning of the dream than were waking associations, and the patient showed a remarkable ability to understand his dreams in the hypnotic state.

The following analysis demonstrates the highly meaningful nature of the patient's dreams, and illustrates his facility in interpretation.

> DREAM: The patient is invited to play cards, but his unidentified acquaintance states that he knows a better place and exits. The patient follows and finds himself alone at the head of a long flight of stairs. Arriving at the bottom, he is confronted with two hallways. In the entrance to one lies a bitch nursing puppies. He chooses the opposite hallway and en route squeezes by workmen who are energetically erecting a wooden construction. He finally emerges into a large empty room in whose center is a small Dodge truck. His friend reappears, but is now dressed in overalls. The friend says, "We'd better hurry or we'll be late!" The patient feels irritated and thinks, "Why the hell did he bring me here to work?!"

The patient's waking associations were limited, but his hypnotic associations quickly revealed the meaning of the dream:

> The two levels represent the conscious and unconscious, and the connecting stairway is the method of hypnotic induction (the patient had been trained to "go to sleep" step by step as he walked down an imaginary staircase). The two hallways depict a choice point or decision; that is, the patient can effect a reconciliation with his wife or continue in therapy. A current conflict between them is her desire to become pregnant, much against his wishes. He related that the evening before, she persuaded him to have intercourse without a contraceptive. The patient chooses therapy and is confronted with the busy workmen, representing a hastily erected barrier, or his defensive attitude to treatment. The room represents his empty life, and the truck alludes to a desire to escape by reversion to the old "dodge" of established neurotic behavior patterns. He is then confronted by the acquaintance, who is now identified as the therapist, of course, who demands his active cooperation. The dream thema is clearly seen as representing the patient's feeling of negativism toward therapy; that is, at first he thought it would be fun (a game of cards—an exciting gamble), but now finds that the sessions are hard work, and he awakens feeling resentful.

This dream is highly instructive of the characteristics common to the majority of dreams. Every symbol is significant and contributes to the over-all meaning, as if the sleeping mind were governed by some principle of energy conservation. The dream is replete with symbols, such as the dog representing the conflict with his wife, the truck his neurotic desire to escape, and the staircase hypnotic induction. The procedure was to have the patient rate the symbols prior to hypnotic interpretation of the dream and then to rate the latent content upon awakening from the trance; for instance, here he rated the "Dodge truck" in the waking state immediately after relating the dream, and then after awakening from the hypnotic state in which he made his dream interpretation, he rated his attitude toward "escaping from therapy into my neurosis."

AS INDICATED, Freud assumed that the degree of semantic relationship between the symbol and the content represented should vary with the degree of anxiety associated with the latent impulse, that is, the greater the anxiety, the

greater the disguise or semantic distance. Unfortunately, there was no adequate measure of the anxiety connotation of the specific dream symbol; however, there were several independent measures of the general anxiety level of the patient. Since the patient showed progressive improvement over a year's time, it was assumed that he was relatively more anxious during the first than the last third of therapy. This assumption was verified by psychological tests, the fact of the wide initial discrepancy between waking and hypnotic ratings which theoretically presages conflict and a high potentiality for anxiety, and the ratings of five clinical psychologists who agreed that of the 13 dreams that could definitely be categorized as nightmares, 11 occurred in the first half of treatment.

Measurements of the semantic distance between symbols and their latent content were contrasted between the first and last third of therapy. No significant differences were found, that is, the semantic distances between symbol and latent content in these two periods were approximately equal. Thus Freud's hypothesis that dream symbols have a disguise function was not substantiated. Limitations of the measuring instrument may have contributed to this result; for example, measurement of the physical rather than affective attributes of the dream symbols was admittedly not well represented on the scales. Nevertheless, this is a preliminary finding that certainly bears further investigation. The results do not exclude the possibility of defensive distortions in dreams, but they do indicate that symbolization is not primarily motivated by defensive needs, if at all.

FAILURE to confirm Freud's theory of symbolic disguise suggests that dreams represent what a person thinks while he is asleep, and though they often express unconscious attitudes, the mode of expression is explained by the sleep state and will be the same whether or not the dream content is of a threatening nature. Our inability to interpret dreams may simply reflect a lack of familiarity with a language foreign to the waking mind.

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PROFESSIONALS, LAYMEN, AND THE LITERARY EXPERIENCE

RICHARD K. WELSH *

A LITERARY ARTIST offers us written symbols that represent his vision of life as experienced by his unique self. He may present his vision directly, as if he himself were speaking (essays, lyric verse, etc.), or indirectly, through the metaphor of imagined characters and events (novels, short stories, etc.).[1] We, in turn, interpret his message in terms of our own unique vision of life. Thus, in literary communication objective reality is twice refracted—once by the writer and once by the reader.[2]

Literature, then, is not a substitute for our experience of objective reality; it is, rather, a surrogate for objective reality itself—as transformed by the perceptions and personality of the artist. Imaginatively, that is, we treat a literary work as if it were reality, though (if we are sane) we know it is not. Through our experience with it we transcend the limits of our own vision, but not by substituting the artist's vision for ours. Instead, we substitute the artist's vision for reality and react to it with ours. Our dynamic participation in the literary process, our *literary experience,* is what makes literature valuable to us as individuals. At the same time the literary experience, since it is a form of communication, has social value. Other kinds of writing do not induce this experience, nor can we bring it about through our efforts alone. But literature, as it is thought of in our culture, does not end with the literary experience; indeed, sometimes the literary experience is ignored altogether. To many people literature means not their reaction to what an author has written but books as physical objects and what has been said about books or about the literary experience by others—the literary salesmen, the scholars, and the critics.

What is the relationship between literature conceived of in this relatively static way and literature conceived of as centering in the dynamic literary experience? Obviously, not much, when books are considered as objects instead of

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[1] See Weller B. Embler, "The Novel as Metaphor," *ETC.,* X, 3-11 (Autumn 1952).

[2] This remark is, of course, applicable to other kinds of artistic communication, as are numerous points in this discussion.

as potential literary experiences. As long as they remain on shelves as a decorative background for the TV set or as a symbol of their owner's supposed interest in the finer things of life, their peculiar value remains unrecognized. On the other hand, the verbalizations of the salesmen, scholars, and critics are related to the literary experience—*ex post facto*. And what they say is used by many as a substitute for it or as a prologue or epilogue to it.

Since what these professionals say about literature is taken by many to be an integral part of the literary process, we cannot understand the place of literature in our culture without examining their aims and activities in more detail. The three classes of professionals, it is well to point out, are not mutually exclusive. A man may think of himself, and be thought of, as belonging to two or even all three classes. However, most professionals think of themselves as belonging primarily to just one.

THE LITERARY salesman—usually a teacher, lecturer, or essayist—attempts to sell others his enthusiasm for the literary experience. Teachers far outnumber the others engaged in this type of evangelism, so we will devote our attention exclusively to them. The teacher comes up through the graduate school and must teach from standardized anthologies and, therefore, in the main, makes his pitch about nationally advertised brands. He judges his success according to the percentage of stereotyped responses he obtains from his students on examinations.

What else can he do if he is going to "teach" literature? Surely his students are not gathered in the classroom to hear about his personal affective reaction to *Othello,* for instance. It would seem more like a bull session than an educational situation if he said, "Once I knew a girl something like Desdemona. And if I hadn't gone away to school and met Lucy (that's my wife), I might have ended up doing something symbolically equivalent to smothering Fran—I mean, Desdemona—with a pillow. You see, to be perfectly frank, I'm a jealous sort of person, and . . . ." No, that wouldn't do. So he finds himself some objective criteria, his or someone else's, that "prove" the play to be as excellent and rewarding as he feels it is. The students dutifully write in their notebooks, "Othello—good play, (a) true to human nature, (b) tragic . . .," etc. Everyone is pleased, the students because they now "know about *Othello,*" the teacher because he has made a successful rationalization.

The scholar is also likely to be a teacher. It goes with his job. He is not, however, interested in communicating an enthusiasm for the literary experience. Presumably he has, or has had, literary experiences; but his interest lies in the context of a literary work—the biography of its author, the history of the times in which it was written, its sources and parallels in other works, its authenticity, etc. What he speaks of is objective data—names, dates, places, and explanations—quite unrelated to his personal, silent-level reaction to the work.

The critic, unlike the teacher, who tries to objectify the affective values of

literature, and unlike the scholar, who tries to discover what its context was, tries to tell us what it ought to be in structure and/or content or what its "real" meaning is. He evaluates or explicates literature according to the criteria of a critical system of his own or someone else's devising. Like both the salesman and the scholar he uses some kind of objective data, though it may be objective only in the sense that he supposes it to exist in a metaphysical realm not available to the senses. He is like the salesman further in that he tries to evaluate and explain literature, but his evaluations and explanations are not *ad hoc,* as the salesman's are. His exist prior to and apart from any particular work and do not depend upon it; in this detachment from the literary experience he is like the scholar. He must maintain his detachment at all costs, for nothing is more tizzifying for a critic than to find that he has inadvertently had a rewarding literary experience that he cannot justify with his critical system.

We can see, then, that the literary experience as a unique, personal event gets little, if any, notice in the verbalizations of the salesmen, scholars, and critics. This is not, however, a sinister plot on their part, since their interest lies quite legitimately elsewhere, on a level of abstraction from which personal elements have been excluded. But even if they wished, the situation could not be otherwise: the literary experience is on the unspeakable level; whatever is said about it is not the experience itself.

HOWEVER, it is an initial interest in the literary experience that brings many people to consult the professional oracles. Most of these people, with the exception of embryo professionals, come away disappointed. Or they become convinced that literature in its entirety consists of conventional rationalized responses to a canon, the study of literary contexts, or the application of ready-made critical systems.

After all, the average man thinks of a professional as one who acts as intermediary between the layman and a body of esoteric theory and practice. Most professionals do just that. Because of their specialized knowledge the physician and lawyer can alleviate a pain in the neck by prescribing medication or divorce, respectively. The literary professional, on the other hand, does not give the counsel sought by the average petitioner. Instead of assuring him that his hunger for and joy in the literary experience are in the fullest sense of the word, "right," the professional attempts to direct his attention elsewhere. This is a natural attitude where a vested interest is concerned. And it is natural, too, in the sense that in our culture he is expected to assume an advisory role similar to that of the other professionals—a role that perhaps scholars and critics, at least, have had forced upon them. For, essentially, their interests and activities are intramural. If they seem to insist that we play by their rules or get out, it is not that they are being snobbish; it is only that they want to get on with the game.

What needs to be made clear to the layman is that the literary experience

does not require the attendance of a midwife. It comes to life in solitude and is, in fact, crippled or destroyed by any intrusion. We know what happens to pretty stones when we take them out of the water to examine them. And we remember how we felt when Dad had to show us how to run the new electric train, our train, before we could lay a hand on it. When the professionals hand us a box of drab stones, mounted and classified, or when they present us a by-the-numbers manual for little engineers, we are driven to shout (if Donne has hit us where we live), "For Godsake hold your tongue, and let me read. . . ." Though our action may be extreme, our feeling is well-founded. Reading is not a spectator sport. We don't want to be told in someone else's terms how to react to *Othello*. Nor do we want to know how an Elizabethan might have reacted, or why. Nor do we want to know how good a play it is by someone else's standards or what Shakespeare "really" meant, word by word. That is, we don't want to know these things until or unless we have developed an interest in them apart from our interest in the literary experience.

In our feeling that the literary experience is the most important feature of the literary process for us as readers, we are supported by two facts: (1) it is this experience that distinguishes literature from everything else, and (2) it is this experience that gives literature its greatest value.

We find evidence for the uniqueness of the literary experience when we consider how many things are written with no thought of giving it to us. Books on mathematics, political science, biology, physics, etc., are written to inform us about objective referents that exist outside ourselves or, at least—as in mathematics, for example—about referents within ourselves that we can consciously apprehend and easily objectify through symbols. A literary work, on the other hand, though it may employ the written symbols for objects and events, has as its referents the author's and our personal reactions to these objects and events, including the affects that accompany them.[3] Though a literary work may, like a non-literary work, lead us to alter our overt actions and our covert thoughts—since our selves may have been modified through the literary experience—its basic function remains, nevertheless, the communication of silent-level affective states by the author's self to our selves.

That this unique function is also the most valuable is not so self-evident. It is true, of course, that we do not apprehend *exactly* what the author's self is trying to convey; we do not duplicate his experience. His message is encoded according to his unique experience, and we decode it according to ours.[4] But this twofold intensionalizing is actually far from detracting from the value of

[3] See S. I. Hayakawa, "The Language of Affective Communication," *Language in Thought and Action* (New York, 1949), pp. 117-127.

[4] An excellent, if not the most hifalutin, explanation of the reading process is J. B. Kerfoot, *How to Read* (Boston, 1916).

the literary experience. For its value lies in what it does for *us, here, now.* As the primary function of literature is to furnish the literary experience, the function of the literary experience is to furnish food for the growth and maturation of our selves. If at this moment in this place our reading of *Othello* brings Iago to the forefront, if the revelation of his character overwhelms our attention, we need not fear that we are somehow betraying Shakespeare. After all, Shakespeare's imagination played upon his source and produced a story of passion and intrigue that was uniquely his, and esthetically satisfying to his self. Are we to starve our selves when the table is set so sumptuously, just because we are not aware of which fork Emily Post would pick up first? Surely this is not the way things were at the Mermaid. A man there could begin with the roast, or he could begin with the sack and stay with it and a pox upon the roast.

WE CANNOT expect to accomplish our unique purposes nor to realize our unique potentialities as individuals unless we seek out that literature which, according to our reading of it, suits us here and now. And we can find what we seek if we allow our curiosity to range widely and follow Bacon's advice to taste some books, swallow others, and chew and digest some few.

Where does this leave the professional? Right where he was before and right where he wants to be—selling, researching, and criticizing, engaged in advancing the frontiers of knowledge in his special field. This self-imposed isolation is certainly legitimate, but it leads to certain undesirable consequences. First, as we have seen, it tends to obscure the primacy—and sometimes even the existence—of the literary experience; this is a disservice to mankind in general. Second, it fosters a mounting spiral of overabstracted and overintensionalized comments about comments about comments about literature that further obscures the literary experience while it obscures the subject matter of the profession itself; this is a disservice to the profession, though we must, in all fairness, point out that this phenomenon is present in all fields of expert knowledge in varying degrees. Third, the literary professional's vested interest in what is said about literature leads him to be touchy about any encroachments upon his territory by other experts; this, again, is a disservice to mankind in general. The literary professional forgets that, if it is legitimate to comment upon literature in his way, it is equally legitimate for others to comment upon it in their way. He forgets, too, that he has, for example, imported the concepts of the sociologists and Freudians when they have suited his purposes. The objective aspects of literature are of value to many kinds of workers—historians, philosophers, and the aforementioned sociologists and Freudians, among others.

But whatever men may choose to abstract from the objective aspects of literature and report upon verbally, its immanent aspect, the literary experience, will remain the reason for its creation by one self and its consumption by other selves. The self that is striving to become fully functioning desires to know other selves.

Complete knowledge would be possible only if one self could become another. This not only is impossible but also would be "self"-defeating, since the original self would be destroyed in the process. What one self wishes is to confront another in an attempt to share experience. Literature is one of the means for self-confrontation, a means that transcends time. Though particular literary works may come and go, it is hard to believe that others will not be created and consumed in their place so long as men wish to know one another—that is, so long as there are men. For if this wish dies, hope dies, and love, and thus mankind.

SEMANTICS FOR THE CLASSROOM

CLEVELAND A. THOMAS *

IN *The Saturday Review* of January 21, 1956, Leo Cherne gives something of a picture of the world which our young people may live in. He sees a world in which there may be seven million unemployed in the midst of great prosperity with resultant pressure from government and unions to intervene in business. He sees a world of increasing numbers of the very young and the very old, with a consequent need for business to bring about new spending configurations to sell goods. We know the flow of language that this effort will promote. He sees a whole new language fathered by automation. He sees increased longevity and a 35-hour week with a good deal more leisure than at present, all with consequent varying uses of language to sell the means by which this leisure may be spent or wasted. In total, new values, not new Vincent Peales, as Mr. Cherne puts it, will be necessary. And we know that the new values will be formed in part by the language of those who build them.

If we are to do anything to help our young people toward better control of their uses of language and toward evaluating the language uses of others, it probably must be done in the schools. And it should probably be done at least at the high school level, particularly in English and social studies. What can we do? The problem seems so immense that many will feel like the adolescent on his first date who was asked by his friend, "What happened?" The young man explained to his friend that he took the young lady to a movie, then bought her a soda, then walked her home, and left her at the door. Bursting with curiosity, his friend asked, "Did you kiss her?" The young man replied, "Well, no. But I would have if I could've figured out how to take ahold." This young adolescent will probably have many opportunities to take ahold, and so will we.

We must, it seems to me, teach our students as much as we can about how their language works. We must show them that language operates as a symbolic system including, I should say, that pattern of language—metaphor—which enables us to multiply the means of words almost without end. This power to multiply the meanings of words in turn means that we must teach our students

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how to derive understandings of words from context. We must also teach our young people what abstractions are, how they operate, and what their dangers and values are. Finally, I think we must teach them the various uses to which language may be put so that they can better understand and evaluate their own and other's language uses.

NOW LET US LOOK at a few specific ways in which this aim may be carried out in the classroom. Here are a series of procedures used with a senior class in English. This class was making a more or less systematic study of semantics without the use of any textbooks. After a considerable discussion of concrete symbols in the world around them, they first made a list of as many things as they could think of, things which they could not do without the use of language symbols. This was done so that they might grasp something of the importance of language in their daily lives. Then they were given a short statement and asked to write a paragraph in which they tried to explain what they thought happened inside them when this statement or any other was said to them. Their effort was to try to make clear how word symbols communicate meaning. Among the points which they recognized were, first, that they heard the sounds and recognized them because they were sounds they had heard many times before and, second, that these sounds carried meaning because people had agreed that they were to mean certain things.

I. A. Richards' triangle of meaning was used as a device to help further this point. The class then went on to some consideration of the various aspects of meaning, such as mood, tone, and intention. Among other things, they were asked to write each of three different types of announcements in two or three ways to show the expression of different feelings toward the listener or reader. The first of these was an announcement that subscription payments for the school yearbook were due; it was to be read in assembly; the second was a notice of a football game in the school newspaper urging all to come and support the team; and the third was a request for the submission of more photographs for the school newspaper.

The class then went on to consider at some length metaphor as a common aspect of language. During a week they collected samples of metaphors from all kinds of communication media: reading, conversation, radio, television, and so forth. The aim here was to establish the fact that metaphor is common to all types of language and not just to poetry. After some consideration as to how metaphor works and what its purposes are, they then took five words, "tigress," "ribbon," "blossom," "stone," and "plant," and wrote a sentence to show one literal meaning for each of the words and other sentences to show as many metaphorical meanings for these words as possible. Of the metaphors that they used they then chose six which they felt they understood best and attempted to rewrite them in non-metaphorical language. Next they compared the metaphorical

and the non-metaphorical statements to try to discover what the metaphors might suggest to the reader which the literal statements did not suggest.

Their efforts to consider language as symbolism concluded with consideration of the problem of expressions of identity. Included in this work was an effort to determine whether the following statements expressed complete, partial, or non-existent identity between the two persons or objects concerned. The statements considered were as follows: "Ted Williams is a slugger for the Boston Red Sox"; "A ball is a round object usually made of rubber or leather and used for playing various games"; "I often wonder how scientists discovered the names of the planets in our solar system"; "The writer of this letter must be a boy because his name is George." With a few exceptions students were able to see that these four statements express either partial or non-existent identity.

Another aspect of teaching students to control their language is context. There is nothing new about the use of context to gain word meanings, but all too frequently the concept of context is limited to only the verbal context. Students need to recognize that without the proper experience the words will not perform their functions as symbols, and therefore, the context method will be useless. It takes a combination of the two for context to serve as an avenue to word meaning.

HERE, then, is one way and only one to approach the teaching of contexts. It was taken from an Illinois ninth grade classroom. The class was asked to write a sentence answering the question: What is (a) .....? for each of five words of varying complexity, for instance, "ball," "horse," "home," "injustice," and "Abraham Lincoln." In other words, they were to define the meaning of these words. With various exceptions, the results tended to follow such patterns as "A ball is a sphere used in games," "A horse is a four-legged animal, with ....," "Home is a place where ....," etc. First, the definitions were examined for accuracy. Question was raised by some students as to whether a ball is always a sphere, as, for instance, a football is not. Then a girl defined "ball" as a dance. The class went on to define "ball" in various ways, for instance, as the ball of the foot, a newel post ball, and the action of being "balled up." This process led to exploring the other sentences in the same way.

Then the class proceeded to further examples. The instructor borrowed from *Language in General Education* the sentence "The board was on the fence," the many possible meanings of which the class explored. The class also brought in other examples taken from their own papers and from their reading of various kinds.

Their conclusion from this series of procedures was that definition is a difficult and uncertain business. This conclusion led to a discussion of the difference between fact and opinion and an investigation of newspaper articles and editorials for fact and opinion. The students' own writings were also scrutinized

from the same point of view. It should be noted that all this material, and what follows as well, was kept in a special notebook. The final step in the series of procedures was a definition of context, arrived at inductively by the students and then somewhat polished by the class as a whole. Both the individual and class definitions were recorded in the notebooks, although the student put down only his own individual definition and the class definition. As it worked out, the definition contained three parts. First, students saw rather quickly by surveying the content of their notebooks that the meaning of a word depends on the other words around it. That meaning also depends on the physical situation demanded such activity as demonstration by the instructor and students who caught on: for instance, that "The board was (lying) on the fence," or "The board was (leaning) on the fence." Finally, one student saw, from the use of "ball" and "balled up," that meaning may depend on grammatical use. At this point it was not discovered that the experience of both speaker and listener influences meaning, although this notion came up later in the year.

HERE WE COME to the question of how to teach students to handle abstractions and generalizations accurately and efficiently as one means of improving their control over language. Let me return to the senior class whose work in the symbolic aspects of language we have been considering. The class began with a discussion of specific words which led them to distinguish between those words that stand for a concrete object and those that do not, in other words, the words that have a specific referent in the objective world, and those that do not. At the beginning no effort was made to distinguish between those concretions which are generalized and those that are not, although this distinction was drawn later on. The class went through a rather long list of words and indicated whether they referred to concrete objects or not. They paid some attention to the fact that the specific meaning intended in a context will often determine whether the word is concrete or abstract. Then they took two or three fairly long sentences from one or more themes which they had written and checked the words that symbolized concrete objects. By comparing the relative proportions of concrete and abstract words in these sentences they made some deductions about their writing and then went further in their own writing to see whether their deductions were accurate or not, that is, whether their writing was too general or, perhaps less likely, lacking in the general.

The class then went on to a deeper consideration of the process of abstracting, noting that different people with different experiences abstract different things from the same situation. They noted, too, that from any given experience an individual abstracts only a part of the total available. Experiments were conducted with a pencil and with an ordinary classroom chair to show that no one person would be likely to observe all there was to be observed about the objects. The class then began with the process level of science, which is beyond our powers

of observation, and moved on up through the abstraction ladder to quite high levels of abstraction. Once it seemed apparent that they had a pretty clear idea of the difference between the abstract and the concrete, they went on to try their hand at practical differentiation. They were given five statments: "I demand *justice*"; "*Loyalty* is what holds a team together"; "All men are created *equal*"; "*Employment* is at an all time high"; "Good *health* is one of the necessities for a happy life"; and were asked to expand the meaning of one of the abstractions by illustrating its meaning several times. The results were then compared in class and an effort was made to lead the class to see that the meanings suggested by the illustrations differed from one person's paper to another because of differing experience. The class then moved on to a series of generalizations: "High school student governments are merely tools of school administrations"; "Publicity about star high school athletes is good for all concerned"; "All girls are silly"; "On a date a girl is interested only in how much money her date will spend on her"; "Boys are dull on dates because they don't know what to talk about." The students were asked to choose one of these generalizations and to try to demonstrate that it was too broad a generalization. They were asked to substantiate this by writing a paragraph of exceptions to the statement.

Let us now move on to the importance of teaching uses of language as a means of leading our students to new and fuller meanings. If our students learn to distinguish in their own and others' language output important uses of language—such as reporting, communicating or stimulating emotion, judging, inferring, controlling behavior of others, classifying, defining—they will, I think, have taken an important step toward the development of the meanings which they need to operate successfully as human beings, citizens, and makers of decisions.

A GROUP of sophomores was using Wood, Husband, and Bacon's *Fact and Opinion* for group reading during the fourth quarter of the year. The first assignment was to read a two-page editorial from the New York *Times*, "This Land and Flag." This editorial is an attempt to describe what is meant by the love of country for which the flag stands. There were, in all, four assignments on this piece of reading. First, the class was asked to read the piece as though they were studying it for recall on the final examination in June. On the date when this assignment was due the instructor went around the class examining each student's book at the pages on which the editorial appeared. As a result of training most of them had endeavored to underline what seemed to them to contain the ideas of the editorial, so that the selection would be easier to review. This particular selection was chosen because it was, to a considerable extent, made up of topic sentences followed by many illustrations. Some students had failed to distinguish between topic sentences and illustration, and for this reason the distinction was discussed until all seemed to have grasped it. The selection

seemed good for this purpose because not all its paragraphs were constructed in this fashion. And the class therefore, was led to distinguish between paragraphs developed by illustration and those that are not so developed. In the end the class agreed on what should be underlined for recall, allowing some latitude for underscoring when the same idea was stated in two or more different ways.

In the second assignment the class was asked to reread the editorial with special attention to the author's purpose and to the uses of language in the passages. Since language uses were new to them, most of them were confused. A discussion ensued, at the time the assignment was made, about what was meant by this part of the assignment. In the course of the discussion they were led to see that language may do more than one job and that the same words may at various times have differing impacts on reader or listener, depending on how they are used. Although the instructor was unable to make the class as a whole feel entirely at ease with this assignment (partly because they wanted definitions of uses of language), some members of the group were able the next day to distinguish between two functions of language: "to tell us something" and "to stir us up."

Their general tendency at first, however, was to think that a particular group of words must do one or the other, state something or stir up emotion. Therefore, they examined certain phrases carefully. For instance, they saw that "servants of fire in the murky splendor of Pittsburgh" was intended to be "emotion-stirring." Since they were unable to see that the phrase also refers to a fact of the physical world, they rewrote it to try to exclude its emotional impact, arriving at "The steel-workers in the Pittsburgh steel mills." The two phrases were then discussed from the point of view of their factual and emotional impact. In the end they saw that neither group of words communicated solely fact or emotion, but parts of both. Furthermore, they saw that what is communicated may depend on the individual and his experience. For instance, they felt that to many Midwesterners the phrase "The sun is coming up behind the White Mountains" would communicate more fact than emotion. But to one who had visited the White Mountains the mere mention of them might be enough to recall pleasurable experience set in the White Mountains. Thus, in the end they decided that language could be put to two uses, to communicate "fact" or "emotion." They also learned that much language seemed to do both at once.

IN ORDER to widen their horizons a little, the instructor then asked them whether all language performed one or both of these tasks. Some of them were naturally sufficiently doubtful of the "all" to question the assumption that such severe limitation could be put on all the jobs of language. There followed a little discussion of other uses of language, such as making inferences or judgments. These items were not investigated thoroughly. Rather, the purpose was to block the concept that all language communicates ideas or emotion or both

and never does anything else. The class was then asked whether these various uses of language were apparent only in selections read in English class. Since they presumed not, but lacked evidence, they willingly agreed to search in various kinds of media for evidence. As a result they brought in examples from many kinds of writing. For instance, one boy, determined to find an example of purely factual language, brought in from a newspaper a statement of "The Complete Major League Statistics." The class agreed that it was largely an example of the language of fact, but one member pointed out that on that day both Chicago teams were in fifth place and that to many Chicago rooters this fact doubtless communicated emotion.

The remaining two assignments were to write and re-write a statement of the meaning of the passage. The class, or most of them, saw that they must, in their summaries, communicate the emotional as well as the factual content of the selection. This exercise brought out the fact that, even considering the amount of previous class discussion of the passage, some of them still tended to "editorialize," or try to change the meaning of the passage. Thus, for instance, a boy who was embarrassed by emotion centering on the flag, eliminated the emotional content of the passage entirely. Others added ideas that were suggested to them by the passage but which did not actually occur in the passage. These four assignments were followed by similar treatment of Robert Frost's "Nothing Gold Can Stay" and an editorial by William Allen White, "To an Anxious Friend."

One of the difficulties of this kind of work is to try to pull it together into a unity. A number of my senior classes have attempted to do this by preparing, over a large portion of the year, a language notebook. This notebook was divided into a series of sections representing the various aspects of language study in which they had been engaged during the year. Each section was made up of perhaps a brief restatement of the major point about a particular aspect of language, and more primarily of samples drawn from all manner of spoken and written sources. Let me give you the section headings from one of these language notebooks: Language and Symbolism; Abstraction Ladders; Context; Definition in Everyday Life; Directives and Promises; Classification. And from another: Symbols; Report; Definition; Slants; Directives; Abstraction; The Abstraction Ladder; Two-valued Orientation. Now let me show you a little more specifically the kind of material which lies within some of these sections. Under "Directives and Promise" a student had clipped from an advertisement: "Star in his eyes—your Prell washed hair." Her comment was, "The statement . . . suggests that when you wash your hair with Prell, your romantic interest will immediately fall victim to your many charms. It is unlikely, however, that shining hair will so completely captivate a man. Therefore this promise will probably not be fulfilled." As an example of reporting, the student clipped from a Chicago Daily *News* of May, 1955:

PANEL TO DISCUSS BROYLES BILL

The Meaning of the Broyles Bill will be discussed by a panel at 8 p.m., May 4, in the Morrison Hotel.

Panelists will be industrialist Arnold Maremont; Rabbi Aaron Opher of South Shore Temple; Dr. John Harms of the Church Federation of Greater Chicago; Dean Eldridge McSwain of the School of Education of Northwestern University; and Edward A. Rothschild, attorney.

Moderator will be Dr. A. C. McGiffert, Jr., president of the Chicago Theological Seminary.

The student saw that the labels attached to these names might carry an affective impact to the reader. But she apparently did not recognize that, although the passage was heavily report language, it might also have had an affective content that would vary with the reader.

FROM another student's notebook comes the use of a tiny knitted replica of a sweater to name the object instead of the word "sweater," although she recognized that even this replica was symbolic. Another student taped a penny to the page to represent the object and drew a swastika for the same purpose. For a report he clipped a portion of a daily TV program. To show various uses of language he clipped an editorial from a *News* of May, 1955, which dealt with Gov. Stratton's cut of the Department of Public Welfare budget. From the sentence "Despite the inadequacy of the program which the governor forced upon him, Dr. Otto L. Bettag . . . went industriously about his job," this student drew "inadequacy" and "industriously" as judgments, "forced" as a loaded word. He also found in the editorial such inferences as "Stratton's is not the kind of mental hospital program that Illinois wants or deserves" and "It [the cutback] may actually set an already lagging program even further back . . ." In the Constitution of the High School Student Government of the North Shore Country Day School, which he recognized as a directive in its entirety, he found this more specific directive: "There shall be no courts or punishments to enforce their laws . . ." He built the following abstraction ladder (beginning at high level of abstraction):

Everything
Thing
Means of transportation
Vehicle
Four-wheeled vehicle
Car
Sports car
MG
MG TD
1952 MG TD
1952 MG TD Factory no. TD 15226

To this ladder is appended the notation: "Unfortunately the actual car cannot be with us this evening."

IN THE END, of course, the question is—What may be expected from classroom procedures of this sort? There are as yet no means of testing results objectively, nor is there any way of following a student through his life to see whether he transfers the language principles he has learned into his everyday behavior. Nonetheless, it seems to me that we may expect something of an increased ability to interpret one's own and others' language uses, an increased ability to control language rather than be controlled by it. If the world of Mr. Cherne comes true, certainly our students will need such increased ability. Certainly they will need it whether the world goes on as it is, changes as Mr. Cherne suggests, or plunges into depression. An ever increasing number of new meanings, to which automation will undoubtedly add, is characteristic of our century of rapid scientific advance, ideological conflict, and rising standard of living. Although these meanings are spread with astounding rapidity by our various mass media of communication, it is doubtful that they are spread with thorough understanding. Our only hope, then, is to assist young people, through the use of procedures such as I have described here and continuing other techniques that we have applied for years, to acquire the control of language that can help them meet the new age of automation.

✯ DISCUSSION ✯

MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FINANCIAL DEPARTMENT

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WITHOUT QUESTION American businessmen have learned how to measure and apply many mathematical techniques to new facets of business activities in the past three decades. Relatively little progress has been made, however, in applying these quantitative methods to management, and our courage in invading this new territory is admirable. We should not be discouraged if our take-home pay from these first efforts in this direction is small. The "pay-off" will surely come. If one were to give a savage ten pennies and tell him in advance how many heads and tails he would get from 100 throws, he would probably explain the prediction in terms of magic or witchcraft. However, the same response arose only a few decades ago when statistical quality control techniques were new; it was difficult to get production men to accept the money-saving idea that, in some cases, it was necessary to check only a very small sample of incoming materials in order to know, plus or minus, a very small margin of error, the quality of the entire lot. Perhaps the same situation exists today in the sense that we are fumbling for techniques which in future decades will be as commonplace and widely accepted as the use of probability mathematics is today.

I would like to take a careful look at what one does when he measures something, let's say the length of a room. One takes a yardstick and finds out how many times he must lay it end to end to cover the distance from there to here. In other words, he has determined the *relationship* of the room's length to the length of the yardstick. By the same token, when we weigh something, we *relate* the pull of gravity on the object we are weighing to the pull exerted on another object—say a one pound weight. There is, of course, nothing sacred about

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the length of our yardstick or the pull of gravity on our one pound weight. They are merely made to bear as close a resemblance as possible to the generally accepted standards for a yard length and a pound weight kept by the Bureau of Standards. They are, in other words, the basis for measurement.

Similarly, in the modern view a watch does not measure time. Instead, it can be viewed as a process which bears a certain predetermined and fairly predictable relationship to the travels of the earth around the sun. If I tell you that I will meet you in fifteen minutes, I am saying that I will meet you when this minute hand travels across fifteen marks on the dial—I am, therefore, *relating* our appointment to this process that I carry on my wrist; it, in turn, bears an approximate relationship to the Naval Observatory's standards which, in turn, are carefully related to observable astronomical events. If different people are given the job of measuring a room, or weighing the same object, or observing a watch, they will agree, by and large. In other words, there is a high degree of predictability in their behavior, and arguments will be kept to a minimum.

SUMMING UP, therefore, the process of measuring may be considered as a determination of a *relationship* usually between an object or event and a generally accepted standard. The benefits to be derived from such a relating include the fact that agreement rather than disagreement usually results and that a high degree of predictability of the outcome can be expected. Frequently our lawyer friends write into their contracts something like "John Doe—hereafter called Party of the First Part." Hereafter, I shall substitute the expression "relating" for the word "measuring." It will broaden somewhat our view of the measuring procedure and will, I hope, prove more fruitful for our enquiry.

In all of the examples I have given, the relationship of object to standard has been expressed numerically. Now, how would we go about determining a numerical relationship between "effectiveness" and a generally accepted standard? I suggest for your earnest consideration that it cannot be done, and while I hate to make such long term predictions, I doubt if it will ever be done. What way then can we find out of our dilemma?

I suggest that the difficulty lies in the word "effectiveness." Somehow it covers too much ground. It's too high-powered. In this respect it is more or less like the words "truth," or "beauty," or "freedom." No way has been suggested to measure them, or "love," or "honor," or even the degree of "obedience." None of these words seems to grab onto something and hold on to it as do the words "one yard," or "one pound," or even qualitative adjectives such as "red" or "sharp."

Part of our measurement problem, therefore, seems to be linguistic. Witness the fact that recognition of the importance of and a facing up to the difficulties of measurement in physics has brought about a revolution in physics in the past fifty years. In this connection, Korzybski in his book *Science and Sanity* says:

> The stroke of genius of Einstein was that he produced a non-elementalistic, linguistic system of new structure. Einstein, being a physicist, decided rightly, as we understand now, to be entirely actional, behavioristic, functional and operational, and to stop gambling on words . . . He decided to describe what a physicist *does* when he measures 'space' and 'time.' . . .[1]

Dr. Philipp Frank in his *Life of Einstein* says, "Einstein's relativity of time is a reform in semantics, not in metaphysics." Now if we were to try to take an actional, behavioristic, functional, and operational view of our problem, where would it lead us? First we would have to ask ourselves immediately the $64,000-question: "What does a person *do* or *avoid* doing when he is being effective?" If we can answer that question rigorously we may get somewhere. Perhaps we must narrow considerably what we mean by "effective."

SUCH AN APPROACH leads me to suggest that there is one other necessary ingredient of relating or measuring which seems to me to be essential: namely, that all relating or measuring must be based on an observable event. We can observe a room's length and the process of determining its relationship to the length of the yardstick can also be observed. The strength of a rope cannot be observed as such, but we can convert the concept "strength" into an observable event by gradually increasing the load on the rope and determining its breaking point. In other words, we must carefully limit what we mean by the word "strength" and state that when we speak of the strength of a rope, we are merely talking about how many one-pound weights a 20-foot length of the rope, when new, will support under standardized conditions without breaking. Without such a rigorous approach "strength" would not be measurable.

I have deliberately selected the relatively concrete concept "strength." For if "strength" is not relatable without strict limitation and rigor, certainly "effectiveness," being a word of higher order abstraction, will be even less easy to relate to a generally recognized standard. If by "effectiveness of the accounting department" we mean that monthly statements of profit and loss and comparisons of actual and standard costs are available on a certain day each month, we can certainly relate the dates on which they were available with the dates on which they should have been presented. Also, such performance can be related to previous years and to other companies.

If by "effectiveness of the insurance department" we mean every "loss is covered by insurance," we can merely add up the uninsured losses and have an accurate measure of the effectiveness of that department. If by "effectiveness of the credit department" we mean "there shall be no credit losses in excess of 1/4% of sales," we can easily determine whether our standard has been met. Such questions as these have answers. Such questions as "How effective is our finance department?" or "How good a man is John?" have no answers. Thus,

[1] Alfred Korzybski, *Science and Sanity* (2d ed.; Lancaster, Pa., 1941), p. 648.

our problem seems to me to be less one of getting the right answers than it is of asking ourselves the right questions. But *that* should surprise no one, since the most important step in solving any problem is to *state the problem,* or in other words, to ask the right question. Once we ask the right question the ways of getting the answers are immediately suggested by the question and in many cases the answers become apparent. We must make certain, naturally, that the questions asked have answers. Many questions have no answers.

I am suggesting, therefore, that "effectiveness" cannot be related as such. All relating must be based on some kind of observation and we really can't observe "effectiveness." Before what we mean by "effectiveness" can be related to something else, it must be broken down and analyzed rigorously into observable events. Note that in order to measure the effectiveness of each of these departments it is necessary to lower the level of abstraction of the word "effectiveness" to an observable event. Without that step we are dealing with a concept that is too high-powered to permit of the relating process. The word "effective" brings no pictures to my mind. Somehow its feet dangle above the level of reality. Meeting a tax date deadline, or having no uninsured losses, or holding credit losses to a 1/4% standard do bring pictures to mind and seem somehow to be closer to the real world. Great progress was made in the 1920's in relating factory productivity to a recognized standard. In the 1930's and 1940's, far reaching steps were made towards setting up cost standards and relating so-called "actual costs" to these standards. Management was provided with tools of great usefulness in both areas. In recent years very real progress has been made in the fields of quality control, as I have already mentioned.

BUT I SUGGEST that before progress was possible in any of these areas, we had to apply considerable rigor in defining and limiting precisely what we meant by the words "productivity," "standard costs," and "quality." "Quality" is measurable only insofar as we have carefully analyzed and defined what we mean by quality and reduced it to observable events. The necessity and benefits offered by reducing human behavior to observable quantities is brought out forcibly in the September-October 1955 issue of the *Harvard Business Review* in an article by John C. Flanagan and Robert K. Burns, entitled "The Employee Performance Record: A New Appraisal and Development Tool." This article, and one entitled "The Critical Incident Technique," which appeared in the July 1954 *Psychological Bulletin,* are well worth reading by anyone interested in measuring human behavior.

Let's return for a minute and re-examine the concept "measuring." Usually, as I said a moment ago, we mean determining a relationship between an object or event and a generally accepted standard. But is a standard absolutely essential to the process of relating? One form of relating which has proven of value but which does so without an agreed-upon standard is relating a thing to itself. For

example, we can compare our earnings for October, 1955, with previous Octobers. This certainly is not as meaningful as relating with a yardstick, but it is better than no relating at all.

Another form of relating without a standard is relating things to each other or rank ordering. For example, A is greater than B and B is greater than C; therefore, A is greater than C. This is admittedly less valuable than knowing how much greater A is than C, but again it is better than not knowing anything about the relationship between A and C. Modern salary evaluation plans represent an application of this form of relating. Nearly everyone I know who has dug deeply into salary evaluation plans feels they are a valuable, though not a perfect, addition to management's bag of tools. With two other officers I once served on a salary committee which graded all salaried jobs in a company with 8,000 employees into 21 grades, and not once in five years did the members of the committee differ by more than one grade as to where a particular job belonged.

But before attempting to proceed further, I want to summarize the premises I have been suggesting:

1. *Measuring* is really a process of *relating*, usually by determining a numerical relationship to a generally recognized standard.
2. Other forms of relating are possible and profitable.
3. But relating is not possible until the concept "effectiveness" is rigorously analyzed into concrete, observable events.
4. If "effectiveness" is to be "measured," therefore, we must narrow what we mean by "effectiveness" and broaden what we mean by "measure" to include other forms of relating.

NOW, I SHALL TRY to take some feeble, first steps towards applying what I have been saying to the finance department. It seems to me that the principal functions of a finance department can be profitably grouped under three main headings:

Score-keeping and Financial Housekeeping

THESE FUNCTIONS would include: (a) accounting for profits and losses; (b) protecting the company against taking unprofitable credit risks; (c) the paying of no more than the just and proper taxes due governing bodies; (d) meeting payrolls and accumulating all necessary payroll and pension fund data; (e) paying when due all bills, taking all proper discounts, of course; (f) obtaining new money at a minimum cost and meeting all interest and dividend charges thereon; (g) forecasting day-to-day, month-to-month and year-to-year cash requirements with a high degree of accuracy so that as small an amount as possible is tied up in cash and bank accounts, which obviously add nothing to profit; (h) developing and keeping up-to-date a manual of policies and standard practices for their own guidance and more efficient operation of the department;

(i) insuring at a minimum cost those risks which the company is not in a position to absorb. And finally, (j) studying constantly its own operations and efficiency and searching for less costly means of carrying out its own functions. Many finance departments are so busy watching costs in other departments that they act as if their own expenditures were of no importance.

Measurement of Company Performance

UNDER THIS HEADING will come the recording of how well each segment of the business has done against some standard or plan or other comparative data. Needless to say, the finance department will often have to see that a plan or target is established before a job is undertaken, or there will be no guidepost to *relate* with the actual. The manner and nature of this relating operation will vary considerably from one segment of the business to another. The comparison for an overhead department, for example, might well be against a fixed or variable budget. In the case of a research project, it might attempt to compare the economic benefits of an individual project against the original forecast. The various sales offices and warehouses can be meaningfully compared with each other, as to costs, volumes, and in many other ways. Many valuable data can be prepared for the use of the market research department in its appraisal of the value of advertising and promotional campaigns.

Perhaps most finance departments do a good job in producing such figures, but I have yet to come in contact with one which was carrying out to the maximum its responsibilities in presenting these data in such a manner as to get the ultimate benefits from them. American industry produces millions of figures and actually uses only hundreds. The really effective finance department must, therefore, also accept and discharge the responsibility for communicating this information—seeing that far more of its figures are thoroughly understood. It must point out the limitations of its figures, and in every possible way teach the organization what any figure really means and the best ways in which it can be used. But their responsibility does not end even here. The finance department must also follow up on its communications to see that they are actually used. This is a lot more difficult and demanding than score-keeping, and obviously requires the utmost tact and diplomacy, along with polite but firm persuasion.

Evaluation of Expenditures

THERE WAS ONCE a time when financial people were the great "no" boys. They were the ones who said "no" to all proposals that involved paying out money or at the very least, they tried in all cases, to bring about a reduction in the amount to be expended. This was called "being conservative," and financial people were regarded as the epitome of conservatism. In fact, conservatism was regarded as being a necessary qualification of being financial. No doubt this tended to make all others in the organization less conservative, if not wild, and

often set the financial department up as a hurdle to be cleared before the much needed new equipment could be built, research project undertaken, or necessary inventory accumulated.

Today the effort of the finance department must be directed toward seeing that all proposals for the expenditure of money are carefully studied by quantitative methods, must see that targets and budgets are set and that a profit goal is established. It may well propose an increase in expenditures as often as a decrease but its most important contribution is advance planning. No airplane pilot or boat captain worthy of the name would set out on a trip without both a goal and a planned course for reaching it and a method for determining his progress at given intervals. *But often some executives seem to mistake activity for action and to concentrate on the urgent rather than the important.* Their every act is a crisis, centered and hectic. An effective finance department should increasingly contribute towards encouraging and, if necessary, forcing rigorous, quantitative thinking on the entire organization, including especially the financial department itself.

As examples I would like to propose some questions that might point up the degree of effectiveness of the finance department. A question which permits only a "yes" or "no" answer is not as likely to be measurable as one which is a degree question. For example, if the question says "How much?" or "To what extent?" it is more likely to suggest a measurable answer than one which asks "Do we or do we not do so and so?" or one which asks "Whether or not, etc." Now for some questions:

How well do other management people understand the importance of "return on investment"?

To what extent do they appreciate the effect of investment turnover on such return?

To what degree do they understand the relationship of working capital requirements to fixed property expansions?

How well does the operating management know how to evaluate the effect of increases in inventories and receivables on the return on investment factor?

How widely is the effect on investment return of extended credit terms taken into consideration?

Do the operating and sales people feel that collections are the headache of the treasurer and that their sole function is to get the goods out of the door?

How thoroughly has the finance department properly educated operating people down to the foreman level in the values to be derived from a good standard cost system using the variance figures reported to them to achieve even lower cost and resulting higher profits?

How frequent are "surprises," or has the finance department so structured its activities that trouble spots are pointed out before trouble arises?

How often and how well is the finance department able to get the operating departments to prepare their own budgets and use them as a

chart of their course, or does it merely cram its own budgets down all other departments' throats?

How concise, descriptive and factual are your reports? How thoroughly and how often are they read and acted upon?

How often are the tax considerations of any proposed action adequately weighed before the action is taken?

How well is the finance department attempting to install and apply cost standards in the distribution field? What about cost standards in the financial paper work field?

How completely is the finance department able and willing to admit its own errors? Is it alert to new, more efficient methods for its own record keeping?

I DO NOT wish to suggest that all these questions have quantitative, relatable answers but I do think that at the least they can be answered. Also, many of them can be further broken down into observable events and related in some way to other observations. As I said, this is only a feeble, first step towards measuring the effectiveness of the finance department. There is a vast amount of progress to be made in this direction.

LANGUAGE AND COLLECTIONS

GILBERT SCHLCHTMAN *

THE SUCCESS or failure of a commercial collection agency is dependent largely on the ability of its personnel to use well the affective and connotative aspects of language. It is ironical that the collection agency, an institution whose function is most basic to the business process, requires for its success a skill which is generally considered furthest removed from the "business arts." Nevertheless, the stock in trade of the commercial collection agency is words and its service is a uniquely verbal one. Before illustrating from the writer's experience, however, it might be well to clarify the position of the commercial collection agency in the business scheme.

A "commercial" agency is one which collects accounts owed by a retailer to a manufacturer or wholesaler. The creditor, of course, places a claim with an agency only as a last resort, since placing the claim involves him in the expense of compensating the agent and perhaps risking suit costs which may not be recoverable. Once the agency has solicited and secured the claim it can pursue either of two courses. It can communicate by phone or mail with the debtor—who usually is in another city. Or it can forward the claim to an attorney in the debtor's town who can institute suit.

Now, though it may be in the creditor's interest that the claim be sent to a

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local attorney for suit before the debtor becomes insolvent, the collection agency worth its salt will forward the claim only as a last resort. If the claim can be collected by the agency by means of communicating directly with the debtor, then the agency collects the full contingent fee, two-thirds of which would otherwise go to the attorney. The agency then has a twofold problem. On the one hand it must exert every rhetorical device to obtain collection by communication with the debtor; on the other hand it must retain the creditor's good will by furnishing progress reports which indicate that the claim is being handled on the spot with personal face-to-face contact. The verbal ingenuity demanded of the collection correspondent is unique in the world of the market place, advertising copywriters and book salesmen not excepted.

LET US CONSIDER a hypothetical instance. A collect long distance call is placed to a debtor, the Jones Company in Omaha. The operator reports, as likely as not, that Mr. Thomas Jones refuses to accept the call, though in some instances debtors owing thousands of dollars will accept a call costing them money they can ill afford, only to report that they are unable to pay the obligation in question. If the call is refused, however, a form letter is sent to the debtor, and the collection correspondent handling the matter writes the following letter to the creditor:

> Our representative attempted to interview Mr. Tom Jones of the debtor concern, but he was not available for immediate personal interview. Strong messages, however, have been left on the premises, and we are following through to effect a personal interview and collection of your claim at the earliest possible date. In the meantime we will keep you fully advised.

Or perhaps the telephone operator says that the phone number of the debtor company has been recently disconnected. In this case the collection correspondent must fish for information, never dropping for a minute, of course, the tone of self-assurance:

> Our representative found the debtor's place of business closed and subsequently learned that the telephone had been disconnected. We are following through vigorously to enforce collection of your claim, but would appreciate any further information you might have concerning the names or present locations of the principals of the debtor concern.

Sometimes the claim is based on a bad check which is usually sent to the local bank and invariably returned with the notation "Not Sufficient Funds." Then the creditor letter reads:

> A preliminary investigation reveals that the debtor may be in serious financial difficulty. . .

Notice the common denominator. The creditor is assured that action is being taken, personal contact made, financial investigations being undertaken. Notice

the qualifying adverbs and the repetition of phrases really devoid of extensional meaning, such as "following through." Notice also that, despite their connotations, the letters are basically "true," that is they conform to the reality of the situation. "Our representative" did attempt "to interview" the debtor, even if only by phone. "Strong messages" were "left on the premises," even if they were only form letters delivered by the mailman.

THE INITIAL form letter to the debtor is followed up by a barrage of communications threatening that, should the debtor not pay, he will be sued "by the attorneys" and the word attorneys is always in the plural for obvious connotational value. The approach is to place the burden of guilt on the debtor, to convince him that he has disrupted the whole business order by his wanton refusal to pay:

> We simply cannot understand why you, as a reputable business man, have not. . . . Why did you refuse the call placed in your behalf?

If the burden of guilt is skillfully placed, and the threat of suit forcefully repeated, payment will usually result when money is available. Some debtors, of course, will react negatively to any approach but a conciliatory one, and are immune to threats of "suit by the attorneys." The writer recalls one debtor who refused to be intimidated by the plural use of attorney and advised the agency that in his small town *he was the attorneys* and went on to say that, by God, there was only one of him.

If the debtor simply will not respond in any way, the claim must then be sent to a local attorney. If there is no progress the creditor is told:

> We are urging the attorney to bring the maximum pressure to bear to force this matter to an immediate successful conclusion. We are insisting that he make a complete report at once.

On the other hand, when collection is made by the attorney his reward is material but not verbal:

> *We* are pleased to advise that as a result of *our* strong efforts we have . . .

IN THIS WAY the agency retains the creditor's good will. The situation is more tricky as the claim increases in amount. But the agency succeeds in any case because, while operating with a few correspondents and a relatively small overhead, it creates a verbal world for the creditor and the debtor encouraging the belief that the agency is more powerful, omniscient, and diffuse than the New York police force. Such is the value of a carefully calculated use of language. By such means the creditor is encouraged to turn over accounts which would otherwise be charged off and the debtor is encouraged to pay his bills. Thus the causes of business and of the collection agency are served.

DON'T USE A PREPOSITION TO END A SENTENCE WITH

C. MERTON BABCOCK *

BRUCE BLIVEN'S recent resignation of his long-held position as self-appointed guardian of the English language must have come as quite a jolt to a lot of people who consider the laws of grammar as immutable as the Ten Commandments. The copy editor, who for forty years had battled the windmills of grammatical error, publicly announced in *The Saturday Evening Post* (September 22, 1956) that he was ready to turn in his tin badge. "It is perfectly clear," he said, "that the American people in their collective unconscious wisdom are changing the language. They have every right to do it. I can't stop it."

This rather startling statement calls renewed attention to a linguistic battle that has been waging for a long time between supporters of an authoritarian principle in language and champions of a linguistic revolution. During the same year that America won its political and economic independence from England, the forces of linguistic freedom effected a *coup de main* against the stronghold of a classical standard for the "King's English." George Campbell, in *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* (1776), urged "national, reputable, and present use" as a yardstick of correctness in language practices. This doctrine of usage was endorsed for Americans by Ralph Waldo Emerson, who affirmed that "colleges and textbooks only copy the language which the field and the work-yard made." Further endorsements came from such writers as Walt Whitman, Herman Melville, and Mark Twain, in the nineteenth century; and from Henry Seidel Canby, Bernard De Voto, H. L. Mencken, and hosts of other scholars and linguists in our day. "The plain people will continue to make their own language," said Mencken, "and the best that grammarians can do is to follow after it."

But the victory for linguistic freedom was not decisive. Even though, as Mencken has shown, "from the early nineteenth century onward the speech of the United States has been marked by a disdain of rules and precedents," traditional, formal, authoritarian standards of correctness have regulated English instruction in American classrooms, and have influenced the attitudes (if not the habits) of the majority of the people in our society. The belief that there is a universal grammatical truth has been cherished more steadfastly than that there is a universal religious truth. As Professor Donald Lloyd, of Wayne University, says: "Our national mania for correctness dominates our minds from the first grade to the graduate school; it is the first and often the only thing we think of when we think of our language."

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THE ALMOST universal attitude of the American public toward this matter is well-reflected in letters of protest against linguistic "laxity" received by the late Bernard De Voto when he was editor of *The Saturday Review*. His answer to the puristic objectors states the liberal position extremely well:

> The "lousy" we heaved into this chaste page three weeks ago is still bringing in letters, and the occasional "hells" which the managing editor inserts to liven up our copy are a benefaction to the postal revenues. We are reproached for say "isn't," we are disfellowshipped for saying "different than" . . . we are proscribed for saying "hooey," and we are damned for saying "damn". . . . "Lousy" was good enough for Shakespeare and it's good enough for a Professor of Education. If the Professor means "lousy" and refrains from writing it, he is the kind of person who would say "lady dog" and there is no place for him in hell, heaven, or *The Saturday Review*.

Defenders of an authoritarian point of view argue, quite logically, that as society becomes more and more complex, as the users of language increase, and as the necessities for communication become greater, rigid standardization of language becomes more and more necessary. Liberals, on the other hand, affirm that language is a living thing, that its very existence depends on its keeping pace with man's activities and accomplishments, and that its changes are natural and inevitable. What we want, of course, is neither a language of confusion and anarchy (cut loose from all stabilizing influences), nor one straight-jacketed by fetishes of convention. We want a language by which we can communicate ideas as efficiently and effectively as possible. The important question, then, is: What attitude toward usage will foster rather than impede successful communication?

Henry S. Canby answered the question by affirming that "good English" is both true to its great inheritance, and to the taste and sense and blood and rhythm of life of the user. He viewed language as an instrument of communication "entirely responsive to the mind that plays upon it." He argued that precisely "correct" English may be very bad English: "as colorful as a concrete walk" and "as tasteless as a mail-order cake." Such a theory not only sanctions and condones the verbal "eccentricities" of a Shakespeare or a Melville, but also embraces the imaginative changes which ordinary Americans introduce into the English language.

WHEN ONE considers specific usages in historical perspective, rather than from the short-range pedantic point of view, there seems no valid reason for condemning the use of double negatives, split infinitives, dangling participles, terminating prepositions, and superlative comparisons. The expressions of a writer like Wolfgang Langewiesche, for example, would lose half their force and appeal if they were shackled by the inhibitions of a grammarian: "Well, it isn't crowned by no castle, that's for sure, and by no cathedral either."

Janet R. Aiken, in *The Bookman,* May, 1931, showed that the use of *like* for *as* is perfectly justifiable from a historical standpoint:

> Back in Anglo-Saxon the word *like,* then *gelic,* was an adjective. It is still an adjective in such phrases as *in like manner* and *a like result.* By a very natural transition, which dozens of English words have taken, *like* came to be used prepositionally. No grammatical authority put up the bars; and *like* as a preposition came to be accepted. But there common folk attempted another transition, by beginning to use *like* as a conjunction (do it like I do). This again was a natural process which has been followed by dozens of English words. *Like* might have got by, like the others; but some grammarians noticed the transition and put up the bars.

The same kind of research would settle disputes over *shall* and *will, may* and *can, lay* and *lie,* and a host of other controversial idioms.

Albert H. Marckwardt, representing that group of scholars known as linguistic scientists, has argued that usage by "the large group who is carrying on the affairs of the English speaking people" is a proper criterion of adequacy in language matters. This theory of usage, which replaces the authority of grammarians with the authority of "cultivated" people, has been adopted as a guiding principle for language instruction in many schools. The trouble with the theory is that "the easy utterance of one educated man is the bane of another." Winston Churchill's "It is me" and Douglas MacArthur's "I shall return" offend the sensibilities of many other writers and speakers whose language habits may be cited as appropriate models for the populace at large.

The lack of agreement among those who carry on the affairs of the nation is exemplified in an incident which took place in the Colorado legislature. A member of the assembly, who had obviously had a high school education, found the phrase "to thoroughly consider" in a bill introduced in the House. Unable to control his chagrin, he stood up and moved that the wording of the bill be changed to "thoroughly to consider," thus avoiding the split infinitive. His proposal was overwhelmingly defeated, and the infinitive remained split by legislative fiat.

TOO MANY people still can't get it through their heads that usage, not fiat, determines "right" and "wrong" in the meaning, spelling, pronunciation, and syntax of words, and that language is a living organism, "not a machine that can be improved by logic and reformed by decree." Not many subscribers to *The Atlantic* would knowingly approve the dangling participle which appeared in the February, 1957, issue (page 60): "Looking back over this compressed and scrambled segment of history, many important competitions are but the haziest of memories." And they would be even more shocked to discover this one in "The Autobiography of John Adams," from the pen of one of America's most aristocratic presidents: "The next morning, I think it was, sitting in my

office, near the steps of the town house stairs, Mr. Forrest came in." The average American housewife is almost certain to take a dim view of any departure from the grammatical principles she learned at school. When Will Rogers' wife reprimanded her famous spouse for saying "ain't," Will replied: "I know a lot of people who ain't eatin' because they ain't sayin' *ain't.*"

At the beginning of the present century, Greenough and Kittridge in *Words and Their Ways in English Speech* called attention to a relativistic, functional doctrine of usage. "It would be ridiculous," they argued, "to address a crowd of soldiers in the same language one would employ in a council of war." Incidentally this theory has had a long and honorable tradition and may be traced through Chaucer clear back to Plato. In recent times, the doctrine of appropriateness (as it is called) has by virtue of the writings of Porter G. Perrin, Robert C. Pooley, John S. Kenyon, and others, become a standard criterion of language effectiveness in many college courses in composition and communication. The theory is well expressed in these lines by Bernard De Voto:

> Good writing is where you find it, whether in *Variety's* headlines or in reports of the Coast and Geodetic Survey. Good writing is the adaptation of means to end, the adaptation of style to the mood, the meaning, and the audience. Good writing is, especially, the use of words which have the emotional overtone proper to the context.

A FINAL yardstick for measuring the adequacy or inadequacy of particular language forms is clarity. That such a criterion has been little used is evident from the excessive amount of ambiguous verbiage that is daily dumped on the American public. We are much less frequently criticized for expressions that defy understanding than for expressions that are clear, honest, graceful, but socially tabooed. If we say "Who are you looking for?" a linguistic policeman blows his whistle. But when a newspaper editor confuses two meanings of the word *true,* no objection is registered:

> If people are to keep their freedom they must have access to the truth. A responsible press reports accurately what people say. But what people say is not always true.

A schoolteacher once reported a pupil's achievement in the following pretentious language: "He's adjusting well to his peer group and achieving to expectancy in skill subjects. But I'm afraid his growth in content subjects is blocked by his reluctance to get on with his developmental tasks." What the educator probably meant was: "Junior gets along all right with the other boys and girls. He is doing okay in the 3 R's, but he doesn't look ahead enough and his future growth may suffer."

Communication which rings a bell is clear or meaningful: it derives from knowledge and experience; it is structured in clear-cut, understandable English; it is organized in harmony with a definite purpose; and it is adapted to the

experiences and capacities of real people. Ambiguity has rightly been called the "crowning sin against the language."

CONSIDERATION of these several theories of usage invites us to challenge our own cherished assumptions about language, and to work out a practical and realistic relationship between language and life. If words are to function efficiently in the creation of ideas, they must be set free. If they are to convey these ideas to others without loss or distortion, they must be adaptable. *What* is said is almost always more important than *how* it is said. Overemphasizing the importance of grammatical and syntactical "correctness," while underestimating the importance of clarity and sincerity, may actually hamper the successful communication of ideas between and among people.

A PLEA FOR ORIGINALITY

MARY SCOTT MORRIS *

CREATIVITY belongs to all. It is the rightful heritage of youth and mature beings. It can expand the horizons to things unknown and unseen and give added zest to everyday living. It grows and develops through continual practice. Yet, how often do our schools crush the source or well-spring of original ideas and self expression and revert to practices completely alien to developmental progress? Instead of providing opportunities for truly creative activities we seem to be encouraging the copying of stereotypes, repeating worn-out ideas and perpetuating "busy work" that should have disappeared long ago from our classrooms.

How does one keep that spark of native talent burning? The spark which gives youngsters self-assurance and confidence that anything is possible? Watch a youngster at an easel. Note the unihibited enthusiasm with which he takes a paint brush and unhesitatingly draws the outline of grandfather, an airplane, or the grocery store—adding just enough lines and color to balance and give unity to the composition. Speed and sureness of effort shine in his face as he includes the symbolic sun to give the proper daytime atmosphere or a moon for nocturnal brilliance set squarely in a strip of blue sky. The satisfied descriptive smile that accompanies a humorous turn to an otherwise somber subject, and the final look that marks "finis" to a work completed, gives insight to the observer of his innate ability as a "master" of line and space arrangement. No uncertainty here of which color to use. The utter abandonment of an experience that is fun and can be accomplished in short order is the rule of the child allowed to create from his own imagination and experience.

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Originality must be a continual force—unpracticed, it withers and dies, but coupled with imagination it flourishes and produces. Pattern-tracing, copying, or directional step-by-step methods of pictorial representation do not result in furthering ingenuity or originality—they only make youngsters dependent upon others for ideas. "I don't want my horse to face that way," says Jim after the teacher has carefully illustrated the animal in that one and only position. What then? Are there other ways? Yes! There are as many methods and means as there are individuals, and Jim's horse should be allowed to do an about-face in accordance with Jim's own inimitable style.

Seeing and feeling are highly individualistic, dependent upon many factors found in life's experiences. Adults and children do not and cannot see alike. Yet too often we try to impose our way of seeing on the child. Who said the sky comes down and touches the ground? If it does, "where do airplanes fly?" Who can answer that puzzle?

DIAGRAMMATIC pictures filled with childish symbolism are understood and explained easily by the young artist. But be wary of too close questioning of the child concerning his finished product lest your face reveal the lack of understanding of his subject. To the child his illustration is vivid and carries for him untold meaning, often hidden from adult eyes. It is best to refrain from naming objects or hazarding a guess until you have heard the whole story. Sometimes the picture contains several hidden clues and only the artist can account for all the action.

Art needs to be kept a highly individualistic endeavor—not competitive in nature but a self-expression of experiences—unique and different. Imagination, original ideas, new ways of expressing things by means of pictorial form, color, and design give an outlet to the inner feelings and emotions and allow communication to others.

The rejection of such communication has not always served to encourage the continued growth of developmental art. A sarcastic question, "Well, what is *that* supposed to be?" may serve as a block for growth. Continued disparaging comments may put an end to future pictorial efforts altogether. It is a harsh commentary of our practices given by Viktor Lowenfeld in his statement:

> If children developed without any interference from the outside world, no special stimulation for their creative work would be necessary. Every child would use his deeply rooted creative impulse without inhibition, confident in his own kind of expression.[1]

Interferences by parents and other adults have resulted in inhibitions that prevent creativity in our America today, while people living in remote sections

[1] Viktor Lowenfeld, *Creative and Mental Growth* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1952), p. 1.

still retain their creative confidence. In Eskimo culture all can, and do, carve. It is an artistic expression expected and done by all, but never in duplication.

In college classes the remark, "I can't draw," is often heard and sometimes traced further to include such side remarks as, "I haven't drawn since the grades when my teacher said, 'That doesn't look like a cat.' " Why must all cats look alike? They don't. Who is to say that the teacher's preconceived idea of Tabby is right? Right for whom? Certainly not right for each child in his particular stage of communication.

Fortunately we do not all see alike or feel alike. Neither do we draw alike—in fact, we are not all equally visual-minded. There are degrees of sightedness and a few individuals are completely nonvisual-minded. This should make us pause in our treatment of budding young artists, our interfering with their creative treatment of fact and fancy put down in black and white or color. Encouragement of imagination is needed—encouragement of new and different ideas, new combinations of materials, new arrangement of space concepts that give originality the freedom of growth and practice that will only be possible if we allow children their natural growth. We cannot afford to stifle the child with preconceived, static styles that any copyist can represent but which in no way further the creative urge that is present in human beings.

✯ BOOK REVIEWS ✯

*Bad News in Pleasant Doses**

A SURFEIT OF HONEY, by Russell Lynes. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957.
THE CRACK IN THE PICTURE WINDOW, by John Keats. Illustrated. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957.

TWO CURRENT BOOKS of more than routine interest attempt appraisals of various facets of the national scene (1956-57); both of them make enjoyable, sometimes heady, reading; and, paradoxically, both paint a rather gloomy picture. Or is it a paradox? Don't we all get a bit of a clout out of gloom if it's served up nicely for our vicarious delectation? In the case of the first book, Russell Lynes' *A Surfeit of Honey,* this genteel and morbid thrill is appropriate: Lynes is a savage entertainer, a tony doom-crier, and he gets as much relish (one feels) from his dissection of certain cultural foibles as do his readers. More about that anon. The other book, *The Crack in the Picture Window,* by John Keats, is a far more serious piece of work. However engrossing it may be to read, the net of it is bad news, to be taken seriously.

Why lump them together, then? First, because (as has been said) each in its way portrays an aspect of contemporary society. Secondly, because each presents a novel view of the terrain it describes, a projection which—partly because of its novelty—provides a fresh insight into territories about which most of us have little more than unformulated "sensations." Lloyd Warner's layer-cake projection of caste and class had this advantage of freshness; so did David Riesman's distinguishing of inner-directed and other-directed. So long as one is semantically aware that these handy-dandy categorizations, or grids, or graphs, or maps, or projections are useful ways of looking at aspects of society, and not ways to see all of it—and certainly not more than symbolic representations—so long will their acquaintance prove rewarding. This elementary excursion is presented here because the two books under discussion suffer from a tendency to allness, as will be seen; yet if this is recognized and discounted, they are well worth the reading.

LET'S DEAL with *A Surfeit of Honey* first. Russell Lynes is, of course, the author of *Snobs, Guests,* and *The Tastemakers.* He is also managing editor of *Harper's Magazine,* chairman of the publications committee for the Yale University Council, a member of the humanities committee of the John Hay Whitney

* Portions of this review appeared originally in the *New York Times Book Reviews.*

Foundation, and a trustee or member of several other socially-desirable and high-minded totemic ingroups. But these affiliations don't hang heavy on him at all: he is the joyful gadfly of a grateful middle class which would rather have his nettlesome attentions than none at all, and they respond with a fond and silly grin when he stings them.

In *A Surfeit of Honey* Lynes proves again that he is not only an original and acute observer, but also the master of a flashing, brilliantly witty style. But to admire this book merely for its observations and its epigrammatic prose is to ignore the fact that it is illuminating as well as fun. For what Lynes successfully attempts here is a new portrait sketch of the America which has so rapidly evolved since World War II. To accomplish this, he posits the obsolescence of the Lloyd Warner diagram of our social structure and proposes instead a picturization in which the social order is seen as a series of free-standing, occupational pyramids with little communication among the men at their tops.

What is like life in this new land of pyramids? We live, today, says the author, in a cushioned, tranquilized society. Money counts less than it did; position and accomplishment more. In this society there is only a middle class, for income can no longer establish a man's social position; it can only make him rich or poor.

Naturally, inter-pyramid communication is necessary, says Lynes, and this is provided by a separate, new class which infiltrates but never becomes part of the various occupational pyramids. This class is the Upper Bohemians.

The U.B. class, according to its inventor's definition, is composed of people who are culturally hep but are not cultural hepcats. (Mr. Lynes is disqualified for U.B. membership because he says "hep" instead of "hip.") Many things interest U.B.s, but few things send them. The U.B. makes a sharp distinction between fashion (which anyone can follow) and style, which requires individual taste. *He* is responsible—not the conservative-minded sportsman—for the introduction of sportswear (tweeds and slacks) as a costume for office wear. His manner is casual and studiedly informal. Although U.B.s are contemptuous of country club society as artificially contrived, their cliquiness and intramural gregariousness make their social pattern very like the country club's—without the club.

The U.B. wants to be one *with* "the people" but not one *of* them. Lynes dissects him mercilessly; what emerges is a comic caricature, a Creature from the Grey Flannel Lagoon.

AFTER some astute observations on the origin of U.B.s, Mr. Lynes addresses himself to the war between the sexes. His conclusion: it's over. The women have won and have magnanimously welcomed the vanquished into a gadget-crammed prison whose confines are the bosom of the family. In exchange for this amnesty the men have become the new servant class—Walter Mitties whose

pride in their mechanical know-how has trapped them into running the appliances supposed to have replaced the servants.

Having demoted American men, Lynes proceeds to a chilling inspection of their appearance. He claims "they have usurped what has for a long time been considered a right of women—the right to look as pretty as possible." As a result of man's colorful-clothing revolt—with the businessmen affecting blue jeans at home and the working stiff donning leisure sports clothes—we have become a nation of mass-produced eccentrics, dressing not in clothes but in costumes designed to convey the role we're playing to everyone else.

The men demolished, the author turns his attention to women. There are, he says, "millions of women who wear their problems like costume jewelry—big, gaudy, and more often than not, simulated." As Lynes sees it, women's problems arise out of their "need" to be and do everything in a world where all sex distinctions except the physiological are vanishing. We live in a woman's world for sure; just as surely, it's not a ladies' world.

What are the life aims of this world? Surveys of college seniors, men and women, reveal that money is secondary; the main thing is to have just enough to enjoy as much relaxed time as possible at home with the family, playing a kind of grown-up's game which might be called *House and Garden*-plus-*Sports Illustrated*. Well-roundedness, good adjustment, middling success (the tensions at the top are too great), and safety are the goals. A job is neither career nor fulfillment—it is a means to leisure. This life stance, Lynes believes, is in part an outgrowth of the experience of the parent generation during the depression and their traumatic discovery that money as a goal had failed them, from which grew an almost neurotic preoccupation with security. Now, in our period of greatest prosperity, it is not solvency that matters but the appearance of luxury. And everyone is living it up, on credit, uneasy about tomorrow and dimly but surely aware that you can't tranquilize world affairs or the national economy with Miltown. By contrast, the depression bore good fruit with the bitter; "When we were afraid . . . we did something about it," says Lynes. Now we've replaced fear with anxiety and merely "fret and fiddle."

Out of all this the author draws an optimistic conclusion seemingly unjustified by the book: we've come a long way in a short time and there's been real progress along with the dross and *drang*. In effect, this conclusion amounts to the author's saying to the reader, "Don't take me too seriously, I've really just been teasing."

But *has* he? Is the book an urbane frolic through a nation-sized playpen—or is it an unbecomingly lighthearted visit to a national looney-bin, a happy-farm without keepers? The answer can be read between the lines of Lynes: the sapient reader will see, throughout the book, that to do what the French call *"épater les bourgeois"*—that is to shock and pique and astound them—the author embraces and then parades a throng of thinly supported and outrageous generali-

zations, because to do otherwise, to qualify, to assess all available data and come up with a reasoned and tentative hypothesis or conclusion, would be to render the book far less delightful. (For example, neither author nor reader could have had so much fun if the poor and the very rich had not been unceremoniously swept from the stage before the curtain went up.) As entertainment, then—eye-opening and disturbing entertainment—*A Surfeit of Honey* (the source is Henry IV, Part I) rates high; as one more bloom in the current flowering of popularized and not-too-responsible books of social commentary, it is best taken with a carload of salt and several 3-D *caveats* for good measure.

JOHN KEATS, author of *The Crack in the Picture Window,* is poles apart from Russell Lynes. For every polished and witty epigram that glides from the pages of Lynes' book, there's a hard-hitting fact from Keats, whose lean and angry writing makes the information he imparts leap from the page and clobber the reader but good. Keats is a newspaperman (or was—currently he's hoeing the lonely row of free-lance writing), and not the feature-writing or daily-stint kind, either. He is a solid plugger, a man who doggedly takes an assignment and goes after it the hard way: research, interviews, follow-ups, repeated assaults on those who would give him the brush-off and the run-around—and, always, a checker and verifier. The wonder is that he has been able to synthesize this information, put it through his typewriter, and produce a highly readable book.

It was while he was working for the *Washington Daily News* that Keats tackled the subject of G.I. housing and veterans' housing projects. He followed through on the assignment to the bitter end. The result is this volume.

It was said, earlier, that Keats and Lynes have in common novelty of outlook. In Keats' case, the fact of his viewpoint's freshness is a tacit commentary on most polemical writing of today. What Keats has that's rare is the capacity to combine passionate caring with accurate reporting, while paying scrupulous attention to dating and indexing and labeling, so that one can always distinguish fact from feeling, flux from stasis, horrible example from general rule. (How different, these days, can a newspaperman get!) Unfortunately, as will be seen, he himself is not always responsive to his own gift: it is one thing for him to ignore the advantages and benefits of development life (however scant they may be), and to overlook the better-planned, community-oriented housing developments which do in fact exist, since both these aspects of the situation are his to exclude from his purview if he wishes. But when he attempts summations and prescriptions, he reveals that he's excluded these exceptions from his thinking, too, so that from his selected and limited data he arrives at generalizations whose allness may deceive. Once again, then—as with Lynes' book—the reader armed with semantic caution can spend a profitable journey through a book of popularized sociology.

The Crack in the Picture Window, a thinly-fictionalized and bitter tract,

starts out with a bang by proving that, this being a democracy, you don't have to be rich to suffer financial calamity. Keats hammers home the point by telling the story of a present-day Everyman (whom he calls John Drone), a credit-created pauper in frayed grey flannels whose miseries don't even have the aura of charm and glamor which hovers over upper- and middle-class disaster.

Drone's is the biography of millions of lower-bracket veterans who sought, and are seeking a brave new world in the nation's housing developments, only to find themselves enmeshed in a sort of 1984 with grass; civilization's auxiliaries all (as the author calls them) "nostril deep in swirling debt."

BITTER the book is, but its author is not. Rather, he feels the icy fury of outraged conscience and compassionate humanity, a Swiftian, frustrated anger against the dehumanizing, punishing demi-life which he anatomizes so fully. There is humor here—the author has a lively style and a sense of situation comedy—but it is of the wildly rueful kind. Don Kindler's witty, biting drawings underline it nicely.

When we first meet Drone and his family, he is living in a barracks-slum in Washington and earning a pittance as a Census Bureau file clerk. Then, for nothing down (and a lifetime to pay), he buys a development house, a box on a slab nestled with its identical fellows by the hundreds on a barren, bulldozed bog. Here, it doesn't take him long to learn that he has no credit standing because he's always paid cash for his pitiful assemblage of worldly goods; but this is quickly remedied. Very soon he is in the same situation as an earlier generation's unfortunates: in hock to the company store for good.

With his credit established, Drone sells his too-small house and buys a larger one. He also accumulates a car, TV, outdoor barbecue, and other essentials. Accordingly, despite his promotion to pencil-procurement officer (and a small raise) he must hold down two part-time jobs, too, but Mary Drone is dreaming of a fly-now-pay-later trip to Europe. As all stretched-thin and baseless edifices do in time, this balloon collapses, in a way as awesomely complete as it is believable, even inevitable.

But Drone's story is really a minor part of this book, supplying condiments (instead of sugar-coating) for a serious, frightening study. Basically, this is an analysis of uncontrolled profiteering and the rotten fruit it bears in sub-standard housing developments and their miserable residents. These huge fresh-air slums, says the author, are not communities at all. They are, instead, fragmented dormitories by night, matriarchal sinks of monotonous boredom by day, row on row of identical millstones around the necks of their inhabitants. He details their total lack of variety; the deadly homogeneity of the inmates in age, income, dwelling, food, tastes, aspirations, anxieties; the fact that virtually none of these people considers this his terminal home, but plans to move as soon as he can and hence has little communal allegiance or concern about group problems.

AS DIAGNOSTICIAN, Keats is superb. As prescriber, he is less so. For one thing, his proposals for dealing with the human waste he so tellingly describes are, for the most part, of the "we should" and "we must" kind. Positive social action seldom follows on such adjurations; on the other hand, the book itself (as a mover of information and as a stimulant to intelligent action) will accomplish more in the struggle against what Keats calls "a wild victory for apathy" than any number of well-intentioned directives. However, one of his specific proposals does suggest a possible channel of remedial action: he urges that housing be treated as a public utility, with a utilities commission assigning a certain percentage of profit on builders' capital investments, thus preventing the profiteering he feels is responsible for much that's wrong with development housing. A concurrent public education campaign on planning, zoning, architecture—and minimum human needs—might, he believes, go a long way toward arresting the spreading development blight.

There is one other weakness to this book which is rather astonishing in the light of its author's general level-headedness. This is a creeping nostalgia for the comfy old houses on Main Street. Quite apart from the fact that those comfy old houses carried with them a lot of comfy old headaches, Keats must know—but does he?—he doesn't seem to—that such houses are out of reach of the nation's Drones because, even if they can find them, down payments are too high and manageable mortgages are too hard to obtain. To say nothing of the cost and effort of upkeep.

But the foregoing are minor flaws. Warned that *The Crack in the Picture Window* is not the all of the low-cost-development story, the reader will find it not only engrossing, but highly instructive.

A. C. SPECTORSKY

H.M.H. Publishing Co., Chicago, Illinois

Semantics for Blueprints

ARCHITECTURALLY SPEAKING, by Eugene Raskin. Illustrated by Robert Osborn. New York: Reinhold Publishing Company, 1954. 129 pp., $5.50.

THIS CHEERFUL little book, about half pictures done with Osborn's manic zest, views our thinking-and-talking about architecture from the standpoint of "a rather jolly little field of study called semantics." And semantics, as every plumber's mate knows, is hipped on notions like: (1) "A statement makes sense only if the methods, choices and purposes of the measurer (observer) are included"; or, (2) To resolve differences that involve intangibles, one must descend the ladder of abstraction to the specific things at the bottom.

"Architecture is frozen music," said Goethe. Lovely as this may sound, it is a static generality in the light of (1), and an elusive generality in the light of (2). "Commoditie, firmness and delight" are architecture's qualities," said Sir Henry Wotten.[1] But that could equally well describe Marilyn Monroe, Mr. Raskin retorts. No! No! No! Architecture is infinitely more complex: a dynamic interaction of architects, buildings, and people.

Characteristic of architects is their purpose, which they can express more—or less—clearly. Characteristic of buildings is their potentiality for playing on the observer's ability to respond. Characteristic of people are their deep-seated instincts and needs, colored by cultural experience. Architecture, from straw-hut to Chartres, stirs us on the level of the "lowest primitive survival motives, no less than on that of the loftiest transient aspirations of which we are capable."

RASKIN is now ready to give some of the terms of architecture's metalanguage a quick overhaul. The high order abstraction "style" merely "concerns the manner in which things are done." Personal style (e.g. of walking, cooking, painting) is an aspect of total personality, and therefore undisguisable: mediocre architecture is the offspring of mediocre awareness. Historical style, no less undisguisably, betrays the culture whence it springs—Westchester Tudor is obviously a brainchild of today. And style used as an evaluative term can point to quality of execution.

"Unity" does not have to hint at some mysterious essence: short of obscurantism, it denotes simply "meaningful relation of parts." To grasp this meaning, however, the viewer must first understand the building's purpose and intention: "A man who has seen very few 'modern' houses is confronted with a Le Corbusier specimen . . . the only card he comes up with is one marked Small Industry . . . what he is looking at is a pickle factory." Conclusion: "the purpose which a structure serves must be clearly indicated in its design."

So too, there is no absolute in questions of scale, no "in scale" or "out of scale" to be determined by authority. "Scale refers to the act of size interpretation, of a map, of an object. You *see* the dimensions of the [retinal] image, but you *think* the dimensions of the building." To guide the viewer we give him cues, familiar objects like bricks, windows, railings, whose size he knows, or thinks he does. In this way we can orchestrate on the scale of the cute (tiny, tiny panes); on the scale of the intimate (everything just a trifle underscaled), thus "shrinking the environment to swell the ego"; or on the heroic scale, the 21-foot doorway.

[1] Sir Henry (1568-1639) paraphrased Vitruvius, the Roman writer whose authority was as final for the architecture of the Renaissance as Aristotle's for medieval philosophy. A less resonant translation of his phrase is: "strength, utility, beauty," which evokes a different kind of magic than Miss Monroe's. As a diplomat, Sir Henry Wotten must have known something about the power of language; he was fired after writing that an ambassador was an "honest man sent to lie abroad for the good of his country."

Scale is largely learned. But rhythm has deeper roots in our being: in our walking and breathing, our days and seasons, our song and our dance. Rhythmic factors tend to establish moods, neurotic or complacent, bureaucratic or intriguing. There is the dignified dum-dum-dum of the Parthenon's colonnade; the frivolous dum-da, dadadum, tra-la-la, ta-ta-ping of the flag-crowned World's Fair pavilion. Rhythm declares itself spontaneously, as it were, when the designer has a genuine message.

But some designers have little to say that they have truly felt, which brings us to the topic of originality: "The architect who sets out to be original, deliberately, does not look to himself as a source . . . [he] examines the works of others in order that he may do something different . . . he is a follower." Artists who are no longer true to their uniquenesses, designers who "have perverted their originality in directions which they secretly do not honor often spend a large portion of the fruits . . . on the analyst's couch." [2]

Under similar scrutiny, that friendly old ghost, "proportion," takes his leave. There just *are* no absolutely valid, universal proportions. "There are only specific *things,* having certain real dimensions—a bathroom door, a room, Ethel . . . a good rectangle for a bathroom door is not a good rectangle for a garage door." "Hold on to your golden rectangles," Raskin says in effect, "I'm going to pull that abstraction ladder away." Which he does, at least to his own satisfaction, by showing that any proportion must respond to internal factors of materials, function, scale, time, and context—including the human variable we call taste.

WE MOVE in, through, and around buildings: time-spatially. From the great outdoors to the narrowing foyer, into the expanding auditorium. Each element is experienced in terms of what came before. Like all art, architecture has its possibilities of climax, monotony, or anticlimax (e.g. pillared hall ending in breakfast nook.) Raskin is dealing here with the time-honored aspect of architectural composition known as "sequences."

"Functionalism" is, of course, more controversial. For Raskin it is the shibboleth of those who dogmatically declare that all forms must be destroyed, forgotten, and redesigned from scratch, and "the less like anything known the better." To such thinkers and their conservative counterparts too, he says: "The term *better* has nothing to do with age, newness, or oldness except in the cases of cheeses and wine." Moreover, if indeed "form follows function," in what way does it do so? Of the various stresses, loads, structural details, which ones are to be chosen for expression? And what happens if "function" is also taken to include the satisfaction of psychic needs—in other words if it takes the perceiver into account? "The young advanced modern, who uses nothing but the latest clichés, is just as traditional as his despised elder."

[2] For confirmation, see Malcolm Cowley, *The Literary Situation* (New York: Viking Press, 1954).

Be that as it may, truth will out. A building's appearance will mercilessly reveal the values and outlook of its maker. Here one will read the designer's thoughts on the nature of crime and its remedies (a prison); on democracy (a town hall); on government of, by, and for, the ciphers (most government buildings). "When the architect 'honestly' strives to find solutions that fit the world as he sees it, his sincerity will shine through irresistibly, overcoming even lack of skill."

Though pioneering in a sense, Raskin's is not the first book to discuss architecture from the point of view of general semantics. And there have been books on general semantics and visual art in general, of which the leading one is Charles Biedermann's still challenging *Art as the Evolution of Visual Knowledge*,[3] which is at opposite poles from Raskin from the viewpoint of lavishness, scope and doctrinal determination. Norman Newton's *An Approach to Design* (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Press, 1951) assumes that the students of architecture and planning whom it addresses are already familiar with the basic dimensions of these arts. Newton, rather more highbrow in tone than Raskin, but still conversational, tackles broader problems of evaluation and refers you to one or two sources, whereas Raskin gives his reader no homework but *Science and Sanity*, and a few pin-ups from Whitehead, Santayana and others. Newton puts fresh, untrammeled design before all else, and sounds like one of those "functionalists" described by Raskin, who sees authenticity as prior to invention. Newton, I'm glad to say, hints at the idea of design as human ecology (manipulation of total environment—Buckminster Fuller's "comprehensive designing").[4] Raskin, on the other hand, takes the consumer's-eye-view of the single building, detached from its economico-physical-social context. As our breathing, seeing, walking space shrinks and dissolves into rural-suburban-urban sprawl and chaos, it seems a grave shortcoming, in a book dedicated to the contextual way of evaluating, to ignore the overall picture of our visual surroundings.

Despite this shortcoming, Raskin's book, so entertaining in style, has the great merit of bringing discourse on architecture, and therefore on art in general, into the realm of the familiar, without recourse to authority or absolutes. One can only applaud the author's stress on the authentic and the empirical. In a world of stereotypes of all kinds, *Architecturally Speaking* is a lucid demonstration of principles of general semantics: painless, jargonless, and with an almost exemplary quality of sanity and tolerance.

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[3] Reviewed by the writer in *ETC.*, VI, 267-271 (Summer 1949).

[4] Buckminster Fuller, "Comprehensive Designing," *trans/formation: arts-communication-environment*, I (1950), pp. 18-23.

Anthology on Man

FRONTIERS OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE STUDY OF MAN, edited by Lynn White, Jr. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956. 330 pp. $4.50.

THIS is a stimulating collection of eighteen essays (including an interpretive summary by the editor) surveying recent advances in those fields of study most closely concerned with man and his culture. The editor has apparently succeeded in getting sufficient uniformity of purpose among most of the contributors to give the reader an impression of an integrated work not commonly found among such collective enterprises. The chief variation among the authors, in this respect, is that some try to summarize salient points of knowledge, while others are content to point to problem areas which are the subject of current investigation. Many of them point to relationships between their own specialty and others.

One advantage of a survey of this sort is that it calls the reader's attention to fields of endeavor which are borderline to conventional academic disciplines. In the last one or two generations, two areas of study have become rather highly developed which scarcely existed before: the *history of science,* which, as I. Bernard Cohen points out, offers a new dimension of human history and a fertile field for the study of human creativity; and *musicology.* Bukofzer reminds us that music is the last of the fine arts to have scholarly study devoted to it, perhaps because the temporal character of music created problems not found in the study of other arts.

A dominant theme of the work (occurring in Kluckhohn's paper on cultural anthropology, Willey's on archeology, White's on history, Neumeyer's on art history, Hughes' on sociology) is the importance of *studying cultures outside of Western civilization.* This often requires new techniques of research, for example, radiocarbon dating, paleobotany, probability theory, projective testing, and a different attitude on the part of the researcher as he finds more conventional sources of data (documents, controlled experiments) unavailable.

Dobzhansky, summarizing recent advances in genetics, illustrates another topic common to many areas of investigation: the *relationship of science and values.* According to contemporary knowledge on heredity, man's biological nature is flexible, intrinsically neither good nor bad, allowing a variety of patterns of development. This variety can only be fully realized where there is equality of opportunity. Thus, genetics contributes to our ideas of what constitutes a good society and to our standards of personal conduct. Another expression of this idea is found in Boulding's very interesting paper on economics. The scientist is becoming increasingly concerned with policy objectives. In the case of the economist, this interest may take the form of welfare economics, accompanying the acceptance of responsibility by government for full employment and economic

stability. This development is made possible by the emergence of new economic theory, derived especially from Keynes, and the increased availability of economic data.

A THIRD pervasive note may be illustrated by Odegard's paper on politics. He points to the current tendency to search for *pragmatic solutions to real problems,* replacing the old search for eternal values and first principles. In politics, some of these problems center around the symbols of power, pressure groups, control over communications media, and political parties. The emphasis is on political behavior rather than structure, on political power as a means of social control.

There are two references in this volume to general semantics. Lotz, writing on linguistics, says, "It is an illusion to hold that a clarification of the semantic sphere would be a panacea, as the General Semanticists claim." He does not specify which general semanticists he has in mind. His essay, however, offers a good general summary of the nature of language, including the organic basis of speech, structural analysis in terms of morphemes, phonemes, and rules of arrangement, and the social function of language. In the section on philosophy, Suzanne Langer suggests that some of the current emphasis on semantics is superficial. The inadequacy of words stems, she says, not from the emotive use of language or aristotelian logic, but from inadequate fundamental conceptual systems. Our world has changed to a point where old ways of imagining and symbolizing no longer fit; we can't make sense of experience; we have conflicting ideologies. Philosophy's chief task is establishing a rational foundation for the propositions of science. This, I take it, will also mean a more adequate frame of reference for daily living. Incidentally, Mrs. Langer directs a few well-chosen words of criticism at the current form of "intellectual retreat" known as existentialism. Because of its abandonment of reason, existentialism can be only a kind of biographical experience and can offer no contribution to knowledge.

SOME READERS may be puzzled by the inclusion of Rapoport's excellent essay on mathematics in a volume devoted to the study of man. Mathematics is a human activity, to be sure, but its subject matter, it might be argued, is not human beings nor human behavior. Indeed, as Rapoport says, it has no subject matter—it is defined by its method. However, since this method contributes much to our knowledge of abstraction, logic, and symbolization, the presence of the paper is welcome.

There are only a few points, I think, where an author's generalizations do not seem supported by the kind of evidence he describes. Thus Hedley, on religion, seems confident that, "Historical, documentary, and psychological enquiry . . . and philosophy and theology . . . argue . . . that the symbol of the eternal Christ revealed in the historic man Jesus is the one best designed to reflect

the confrontation of finite man by the infinite God." One may also feel uncertain about the contention in Gardner Murphy's paper on psychology that parapsychology will make great progress in the near future. More striking, however, are certain omissions. One would think that one of the overwhelming problems facing humanity is simply survival in the face of potential destruction by war. None of the contributors to this volume seems concerned about it; I think the only mention of the hydrogen bomb is in the paper on literature, by Howard Mumford Jones. Another such problem is the pressure of rapidly increasing population on the world's resources. Kimble's paper on geography makes a brief and partial reference to this; otherwise, silence. The potentialities of information and decision theory, mentioned by Boulding, might be worthy of much greater attention.

WHITE'S CONCLUSION describes four basic changes in the "canons" of our culture: (1) from the canon of the Occident to the canon of the globe; (2) from the canon of logic and language to the canon of symbols; (3) from the canon of rationality to the canon of the unconscious; and (4) from the canon of the hierarchy of values to the canon of the spectrum of values. These changes in our fundamental concepts and standards might also be described, it seems to me, in terms of a shift to a more universal and general frame of reference, to wider context for human activity, to a greater tolerance of diversity in values and behavior.

The general impression left on this reader is one of rapid and challenging advance on a broad front of inquiry.

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✡ CORRESPONDENCE ✡

The Good Cause of Defamation

SIRS: This letter, heaven knows, has to do with semantics, but in a way that may be too light for your erudite but most interesting magazine. I had thought that our labor union problems were sufficiently involved. But here is a bit of baffling correspondence that I have had with the legislative representative of one of our railroad brotherhoods. Said my correspondent in his first letter:

> I have been a reader of *Readers Digest* for many years and my main idea in buying the magazine is to read your writings on word power. I wish you would give me the names as many as you can that applies to a person that is, insolent, contemptious, callous, contumacious. I have to use these words often and these are the ones that I have to use most of the time. If there is any others I wish you enumerate them for me.

Well, who am I not to help along the good cause of defamation? So I replied:

> I am going to do what I can for you about the four words that you mentioned in your letter. Let's take them in order:
>
> *insolent:* abusive, impudent, disdainful, boldly rude or disrespectful, contemptuous, insulting, overbearing, haughty.
>
> *contemptuous:* disdainful, arrogant, contumilious, insolent, scornful, refractory.
>
> *callous:* hardened in mind and feelings, insensitive, indifferent.
>
> *contumacious:* stubbornly perverse and rebellious, wilfully and obstinately disobedient, recalcitrant, refractory (unruly), belligerent or bellicose (fond of fighting) despiteful.
>
> There are some other words along these lines, such as: blatant (loud mouthed), iniquitous (wicked), specious (tricky, as "specious reasoning"), invidious (offensively unfair), pernicious (harmful, as "the pernicious habit of name-calling").
>
> It has just occurred to me that there is a book of mine that might give a fuller answer to the questions you asked. In it there are several chapters devoted to adjectives and nouns that are unflattering and have a great deal of power.[1]

[1] [Editor's Note: Dr. Funk is the author of several books on vocabulary-building; among them are *Thirty Days to a More Powerful Vocabulary* (1942), *Word Origins and Their Romantic Stories* (1950), and *Six Weeks to Words of Power* (1953). He also conducts a department on word-power in *Reader's Digest*.]

> Now would you be good enough to satisfy my curiosity on this point? You said that you had to use words such as *callous, contumacious,* etc. very often, and that "these are the ones that I have to use most of the time." I would be much interested to know in what connection and for what purpose you use them.

So back he came with:

> In reference to your statement that you would like to have your curiosity satisfied, as to why it was necessary for me to us these words, struck me as something unusual. I have to supervise a lot of uneducated men from the south that are loaded with impertinence and guilty of insubordination and I have trouble in expressing my thoughts on them when I report them to the office. As a legislative representative, I come in contact with a lot of the politicians, that practice their duplicity and insidiousness with us by trying to make believe they are favorable for legislation that is coming up and in reality they are not they are just trying to get all the information they can so they will be in a position to demand a larger bribe from the lobbysts representing capital. The unions do not have any money to bribe for votes all we can offer is our good will in using our effort to get them relected with votes from the members. When I make a report to the union office of how different members of the legislature, stand on legislative matters, I have to describe them in unflattering names at times.

Dear fellow-readers of *ETC.*, did I do wrong?

WILFRED FUNK

The Kingsway Press, New York, N. Y.

Reflections on a Personality Test

SIRS: Having various aches and pains and having been assured by a number of doctors that there was nothing physically wrong with me to account for these, at long last and in desperation I hied me to a psychiatrist. He talked with me for half an hour or so, and then gave me a printed test to take home and fill out.

Since I was truly eager to be relieved of my pains, I sat me down with a will (and a pencil) to mark each statement, according to instructions, "True" or "False." In spite of my strong desire to cooperate in this test, there seemed to be many statements I was quite unable to mark, not because they were difficult to understand—indeed, the language in which they were couched could easily be understood by a ten-year-old—but it seemed to me that he would have to be a mighty opinionated ten-year-old to be able to mark them at all.

The statements I did not mark fall into a number of categories. Some, such as "I used to like 'drop the handkerchief,'" I cannot answer because, being now in my fifties, I cannot remember. Some, such as "I like mechanics maga-

zines," "I like to raise house plants," and "I like to cook," leave me so indifferent I don't know what mark to put down. Or perhaps indifference is the wrong word. I sometimes pick up my husband's mechanic magazines to read; I have a number of house plants; I am a good cook. But whether or not I "like" these things seems so unimportant I have never considered it. At least one statement, "I like mannish women," aroused my resentment, since I do not feel that *that* classification is in itself an adequate reason either for liking or disliking.

Some questions involved predictions which I do not feel qualified to make, such as "If given the chance I could do some things that would be of great benefit to the world." Some involved comparisons with factors unknown to me, such as "I can stand as much pain as others can" and "I think Lincoln was greater than Washington." Some statements involved guesses about the opinions of others. The instructions said to "read each statement and decide whether it is true as applied to you or false as applied to you." If they had said "in my opinion," I might have found it easier to mark such questions as "I am often not in on the gossip of the group I belong to" or "I am liked by most people who know me." Some questions seemed to me meaningless without further information, such as "I have not lived the right kind of life" and "I am an important person."

The largest class of statements I left unmarked was the one containing value-judgments, more or less concealed by the naive language, such as "Any man who is willing and able to work hard has a good chance of succeeding," "Most people are honest chiefly through fear of being caught," "Most people make friends because friends are likely to be useful to them," and "It is alright to get around the law if you don't actually break it."

The instructions told me, gently but firmly, "Remember, try to make *some* answer to each statement," and so I did mark many statements which seemed to involve me in dichotomies which I try to avoid. One often tends to act inappropriately in situations which elicit spontaneous reactions without time for reflection. (One hopes that at least some of the awareness of the unique quality of each situation and each individual does spill over and show up even in moments of unpleasant surprise.) I am curious to know how a test which operates on such a primitive level of semantic reaction can produce information about a person who does not so operate in a written test which may be marked at leisure and in solitude.

Perhaps there is information somewhere available to the interested layman about these tests—how they are devised and checked, how they work, how they are scored, and how valid their results have been found to be.

K.M.V.

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